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Preface 
 
A symposium was held in the Suntory and Toyota International Centres for 
Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD) on 27 October 2000 in order 
to discuss some aspects of Japan’s many-sided relations with Asia during the 
last fifty years. 
 
The speakers were Dr John Weste, Department of East Asian Studies, 
University of Durham; Miss Mutsumi Hirano, Ph.D. candidate, Department of 
International Relations, London School of Economics; and Professor Kenji 
Tozawa, a visitor at STICERD during the session 1999-2000 and secretary of 
the Indo-Japanese Friendship Society. The Centres are grateful to them for 
agreeing to the publication of their papers. 
 
November 2000 
 
 
 
Abstracts 
 
(Weste paper): deals with Japan’s return to trading with the countries of 
Southeast Asia in the early 1950s and the responses of the United States and 
British governments. 
 
(Hirano paper): provides an overall picture of the Japanese history textbook 
disputes with China and South Korea in 1982 and 1986, and the 
repercussions of these diplomatic rows in Asia and beyond. The paper also 
sheds light on the internal discussion of these topics in the Japanese Diet and 
in government circles. 
 
(Tozawa paper): deals with the phenomenon of religious-based parties in India 
and Japan joining coalition governments in the 1990s. In India, the religious-
based party, Bharatiya Janata party, formed (with allies) the government in 
1998. In Japan the religious-based party, Komeito, joined the coalition 
government led by the Liberal-Democratic party in 1999. 
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Britain, Japan and South-East Asia in the 1950s 
Anglo-Japanese Economic Relations in the De-colonising Empire 
 
John Weste 
 
In October 1948, for the benefit of the annual Conservative Party conference, 
Winston Churchill spoke assuredly of the ‘Three Circles’ upon which Britain’s future 
as a world power was based: British links with the circle of Commonwealth and 
Empire; the circle of the English-speaking dominions, Great Britain and the United 
States; and the circle of a United Europe purportedly reinforcing British might in the 
remaining two. Indeed, if one were to envision the three interlocking circles, it would 
become immediately apparent that Britain was ‘the only country which has a great 
part in every one of them’.1 While not equal to the Superpowers, the United 
Kingdom’s global interests would at least partially compensate for diminished 
capabilities. With Churchill’s return to power in 1951, this concept was installed as 
the basis of the Conservative government’s foreign policy and even used in the 
publicity of diplomatic missions.2 Equally, given this almost celestial self-
appointment as ‘the very point of junction’3 it was inevitable that the impact of 
Japanese economic resurgence and trade would also have to be faced in each 
circle.  
 
The relationship between the British and Japanese home islands themselves was 
thus embedded in the needs and direction of the recovering Japanese economy 
over the 1950s, in British connexions with Empire and Commonwealth (English-
speaking or otherwise), and in the crucial relationship with the United States. The 
1950s saw the return of Japanese sovereignty, the Cold War entrenched in East 
and South-East Asia, and the subsequent increased American involvement in the 
region. In the Far East, Britain attempted to utilise Washington’s financial might in 
the regional struggle against communism and to prolong London's indirect political 
influence over the de-colonising South-East Asian members of the Commonwealth. 
The question of Japan's future economic security, social stability and continued 
alliance with the capitalist bloc was intimately linked to all these concerns, in which 
the stance of the United Kingdom was of crucial importance. The purpose of the 
present paper is to look more closely at Anglo-Japanese economic relations in the 
context of these broader considerations. 
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British perceptions of the challenges, threats or even the opportunities posed by the 
Japanese economy transcend any one period of modern Anglo-Japanese relations. 
Images of cheap labour and sweatshops were evoked by inter-war Lancashire in 
response to the perceived unfairness of Japanese competition. Similarly, opinions in 
the late 1960s, and especially the 1970s and 1980s, saw the sweat shops of the 
1930s merged with the war-time Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere to depict a 
new economic animal: a Japan at war with the West with the sarariman (salaryman) 
as the modern-day incarnation of the Imperial Japanese Army.4 Such perceptions 
have their resonances in the 1950s as well, and doubtless played a part in the 
history of 1950s economic and trading relations between Great Britain, the sterling 
area and Japan. It is vital, however, to locate these relations in a more strategic 
context. 
 
For much of the 1950s, the existence of British imperial possessions and the 
Commonwealth in South-East Asia was held to be indispensable to a continued 
global role for Britain in an international environment dominated by the two 
superpowers. Although post-war American pre-eminence, the Cold War, anti-
colonialism and relative British decline ultimately ensured the failure of such policies, 
this was not at all clear in the early 1950s. Whilst aware of complexities and 
potential damage from Japanese trade, UK officials saw a guided Japanese 
economic return to the South-East Asian region as a means of promoting local 
economic development. In turn, this measure would more tightly link both Japan and 
British possessions to the capitalist bloc in the crusade against communism. This 
decision was made in full knowledge of the long history of Anglo-Japanese trade 
friction.  
 
In this sense, the division between the priorities of the British government and those 
of British exporters, many of whom were involved with textiles, is clear. The 
government steadfastly insisted the textile sector stoically accept its diminished 
position in the order of international trade. As a result, British business was often 
puce with rage over official policy regarding Japan. Its representatives, such as the 
Chairman of the Cotton Board, Sir Raymond Streat, regularly reached back to pre-
war times to find evidence to support their views regarding a renewed Japanese 
trading threat to Great Britain. However, while war-time imagery and Japanese 
atrocities could stir up a useful hysteria, and doubtlessly reinforced many 
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perceptions with regard to Japan, they were not an essential component of the 
business case against expanded Japanese trade. Furthermore, despite the 
aforementioned division, business was not entirely without successes in seeking to 
apply political pressure to define the form of Anglo-Japanese trading relations. For 
example, pressure from the British textile sector was important in stimulating 
London’s opposition to Japan’s entry into GATT until 1955; even then, the United 
Kingdom still saw fit to deny Japan most-favoured-nation status. 
 
Also of significance to British policy was Japan’s close relationship with the United 
States in the context of the Cold War, as well as London's own treasured version of 
an American alliance. The United Kingdom could not but pay a great deal of 
attention to American policy for East and South-East Asia. The British Embassy in 
Washington, sensitive to American criticism of the sterling bloc and colonial policy, 
was witness to many complaints that the UK was squeezing Japan out of South-
East Asia. The feared effect was a Japanese return to pre-war patterns of trade with 
Northeast Asia, a region controlled by communist powers.5 Concern over the 
interests of the more powerful American partner was always apparent. Of equal 
importance, however, was the simple fact that British trading actions vis-à-vis Japan 
and South-East Asia were held to be of vital significance to American policy 
success.  
 
American officials in occupied Japan, such as Kenneth Morrow of SCAP's (Supreme 
Commander of Allied Powers)6 Economic and Scientific Section, vigorously 
promoted South-East Asia as a key source of raw materials for Japanese 
manufacturers and a logical market for the resultant products. Anything less would 
harm Japanese potential as the ‘Workshop of Asia’. The 1950s also saw the initial 
interest of certain Japanese businessmen and bureaucrats in developing a South-
East Asian supply base and market. It is apparent that Japan’s reparations 
programme informed this early concern for South-East Asian economic 
development, but the anticipated economic and political returns of co-operating with 
United States anti-communist policy in the Far East were no doubt also a factor.  
 
However important, inevitably the South-East Asian connexion did not represent the 
sum total of Anglo-Japanese economic relations, particularly in the context of the 
retreat from empire in the latter half of the 1950s. As the decade progressed, Anglo-
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Japanese trade expanded to cover a broad variety of goods, ranging from 
glassware, iron and steel to nuclear technology and jet engines. Nonetheless, in the 
earlier part of the 1950s, the priorities in the Anglo-Japanese bilateral relation were 
in many ways set by the South-East Asian and colonial dimension. Furthermore, the 
balance of UK-Japanese economic relations in the 1950s, particularly in the arena 
of South-East Asia, neatly demonstrates the many complications Britain faced in re-
establishing its international standing, power and prestige. The 1941-45 Far Eastern 
military conflict had ensured America’s succession as the dominant Western power 
in East Asia as well as the on-going search of indigenous peoples for independence 
from the ties of empire. It will be shown how, increasingly over the 1950s, within the 
de-colonising empire in South-East Asia the pattern of Anglo-Japanese business 
and trading relations confirmed these realities politically and economically.  
 
i) Anglo-Japanese Trading Relations and South-East Asia 
Numerous studies have examined the US-Japanese relationship in the context of 
the Cold War in Asia.7 Their focus lies on American support for the ‘Workshop of 
Asia’ and its sponsorship of a Japanese economy re-directed away from Northeast 
to South-East Asia as a source of raw materials and a market for Japan’s 
manufactures. This approach, however, neglects the fact that Britain retained 
considerable economic and political influence in South-East Asia, and not merely 
within the formal empire. Recent scholarship emphasises the vitality of British policy 
initiatives and regional planning to combat the Cold War in Asia. American weight 
behind Japan was crucial, but equally so was London’s attitude towards a re-
invigorated Japanese economic presence in South East Asia.8 As the British 
Embassy in Thailand correctly observed to the foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, 
Japan’s attempts to develop its export market in South-East Asia relied much upon 
British co-operation.9 
 
The revival of Japanese interest in promoting an economic return to South-East 
Asia following defeat and occupation was both rapid and logical. The region 
represented a valuable source of non-dollar imports. Further, the developing Cold 
War in Asia (symbolised by the 1949 communist victory in China and the June 1950 
outbreak of the Korean War), when combined with the gradual removal of Allied 
restrictions following the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan, provided 
additional motivation for a Japanese economic expansion southwards.  
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In 1953, the career bureaucrat and Keidanren10 vice president, Uemura Kôgorô, 
publicly lambasted the Japanese government for failing to conclude treaties of 
navigation and commerce with South-East Asian governments. He regarded the 
region as resource-rich and its development essential to ensure Japan the supply of 
cheap raw materials crucial to lowering the costs of manufactured goods.11 Other 
Keidanren officials followed suit and demanded the settlement of reparation 
payments as a further means of spearheading Japanese economic penetration of 
the region. Payments, desirably with goods and services, would raise the level of the 
region’s economy, which in turn would lead to new markets for Japanese goods and 
demands for investment. One response of the Japanese government came in June 
1953 with the formation of the South-East Asia Council within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. At its head sat Hara Yasusaburô, a long-time exponent of expanded trade 
with South-East Asia and president of Nippon Kayaku.12 Depending upon the 
method, Hara reasoned that reparations payments would, from an economic 
perspective, ‘create a favourable relationship of inseparability [thus] opening a 
permanent market for Japanese goods’.13 Quite simply: ‘We shall be able to turn 
misfortune into fortune’.14 
 
Other Japanese paid attention to the matter of aid. Clearly, any assistance Japan 
could offer in the short term was limited as domestic reconstruction absorbed the 
bulk of Japan’s scarce resources. Nonetheless, Fukushima Masao, a member of the 
Keidanren secretariat, argued that technical and economic aid would stimulate 
South-East Asian economic development and heighten the region's purchasing 
power. In the process, Japan might create competitors in the field of cotton yarn 
exports, for example, but Fukushima considered the long-term gains to be worth the 
risk.15 Finally, it is worth noting the military context of Japan’s economic interests in 
South-East Asia. Former president of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and chairman of 
the Keidanren-connected Defence Production Committee, Gôko Kiyoshi, anticipated 
American off-shore procurement and mutual security assistance to fund $10 million 
worth of military sales to Indo-China alone.16 In March 1956, Keidanren dispatched 
a Goodwill Mission to South-East Asia with the hidden aim of exploring the potential 
market for Japanese munitions.17 One direct result of this Goodwill Mission was the 
September 1956 formation of Japan Technical Co-operation Co. Ltd which oversaw 
the dispatch of several teams of Japanese technicians under the command of 
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former Rear Admiral Shimizu Fumio to repair South Vietnamese naval dockyards 
and military facilities.18 
 
However Japan approached the region, though, the legacy of bitterness and anti-
Japanese sentiment caused by the disastrous occupation of much of the area in the 
Second World War could not be avoided. Fukushima called for sensitivity: desire for 
raw materials should not blind the Japanese to alternative South-East Asian visions 
of development. Co-operation was the key: ‘I desire that we be more humble and 
prudent’.19 Tôshiba president, Ishizaka Taizô, was more blunt in calling for Japan to 
‘reject egoism: we must not fail twice’.20 
 
Purged of egoism or otherwise, by the mid-1950s Japanese failure in South-East 
Asia was appearing most unlikely. From the late-1940s onwards, Japan had entered 
into trade agreements with Burma and began exchanging manufactured goods, 
such as rolling stock, for rice with Thailand.21 Within British territories, too, Japan’s 
presence was soon felt. In 1948, Japanese imports from Malaya and Singapore 
amounted to approximately £2.5 million, and exports to the same territories were 
around £1.65 million. By 1951 the growth fuelled by the Korean War had been 
phenomenal, and the equivalent figures were roughly £19.6 million and £30.46 
million respectively.22 Over January to May 1954, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development surveyed Malaya, with an eye to advising on 
economic development, and concluded that, given Malayan iron-ore mining’s 
dependency upon exports for survival, Japan constituted the logical market. In 1954 
Malayan iron-ore production totalled 1,212,780 tons, of which 1,039,430 was 
exported to Japan. Bauxite mining at Telok Ramunia, Johore, provided a similar 
example, where again the bulk of the monthly production of 20,000 tons was 
shipped to Japan.23  
 
By 1952, Japan’s trade with the whole of South-East Asia accounted for fifteen 
percent of exports as compared to twelve percent in 1937. The same year imports 
from South-East Asia accounted for eleven percent of Japan’s total imports by 
value, which represented a slight increase over the 1937 figure of ten percent. 
Demonstrative of such trends, Japan participated in international bodies such as the 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), the International Rice 
Commission and the Food and Agriculture Organisation with a view to further 
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promoting regional economic influence. In October 1954, Japan was granted 
membership in the Colombo Plan sponsoring South and South-East Asian 
economic development.24 
 
Japan’s rapid economic return to South-East Asia, and its powerful American 
support, provoked mixed reactions on the part of the British government, 
bureaucracy and commercial interests. A gallimaufry of responses was employed 
from cautious encouragement, suspicion, and resignation, to the September 1952 
anti-Japanese campaign of the Daily Express.25 While an absolute distinction is 
impossible, in general British manufacturing concerns and some local colonial 
administrators identified Japan as a rival and dangerous economic competitor to be 
compelled and repelled with high tariffs, strict controls and quotas. Despite such 
fears, Westminster and Whitehall tended to support Japanese economic recovery 
and the economic push into South-East Asia, albeit with care and often distaste.  
 
This response is not necessarily a puzzling one. Certainly, Japan’s almost casual 
military humiliation of Britain in South-East Asia, coupled with the brutal treatment of 
POWs, created a bitter legacy that, as Japanese imperial visits show, remains to 
this day. Further, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Britain's South-East Asian 
territories and dependencies were viewed as crucial to United Kingdom economic 
recovery, and to the UK’s global strategic interests. Nonetheless, British officials 
were not necessarily intent upon selling-out British interests to the Japanese, or, for 
that matter, to the United States. Instead, they felt that, if properly harnessed, 
Japanese economic strength could contribute to an improvement in regional living 
conditions, and hence help fulfil British plans for regional security and the defeat of 
communism. In addition, Tokyo’s economic contribution, whether wanted or 
otherwise, soon proved essential given the difficulties London faced in persuading 
UK financial and business concerns to provide for South-East Asian development.26 
In this context, Japanese return to South-East Asia reflects the process of British 
de-colonisation and the growth of more attractive non-imperial markets for UK 
enterprises, as much as any desire to co-operate with the United States in the Cold 
War. 
 
Non-metropolitan views were made clear at least as early October 1949 when R. F. 
Hollyer of the British Embassy, Washington, informed the Foreign Office with 
 
8
cautious optimism of increased potential for multilateral co-operation and American 
aid to South-East Asia. Less buoyantly, however, he recorded American reference 
to South-East Asia as a market and supplier of raw materials to Japan and called for 
vigilance ‘over the extent to which the Americans seek to expose South-East Asia to 
Japanese penetration’.27 Local British officials in Malaya made similar observations. 
Malayan iron ore was an imperial resource with never again ‘any question of its 
export...to Japan’.28 In 1953, General Sir Gerald Templer, high commissioner to the 
Federation of Malaya, portrayed Japanese economic interests as a revival of the 
Co-prosperity Sphere under different garb; a claim others were destined to repeat.29 
 
UK enterprises also moved quickly to warn against Japanese economic activities. 
Fears of unscrupulous business practices, such as dumping, prevailed, only to be 
reinforced by the January 1954 Anglo-Japanese Payments and Trade Agreement, 
which removed most colonial restrictions on imports of Japanese products. 
Lancashire, home of Britain's textile industries, protested tonitruously and, as the 
Economist observed, ‘when trade with Japan is under discussion all kinds of 
emotion are bound to be unleashed’.30 To many, it was certainly preferable to give 
full rein to passion rather than Japan. Few forgot that the Japanese share of textiles 
imported into Malaya had risen mortifyingly quickly from 24% in 1929 to 48% in 
1933.31 As early as September 1946, Lancashire had begun warning of the threat 
posed by Japan and, over the late 1940s and early 1950s, continually implored the 
British government to impose quota and import restrictions on the Japanese.32 
These concerns were frequently channelled through Sir Raymond Streat, chairman 
of the Cotton Board 1940 to 1957, whose diaries demonstrate the extent to which 
Japan dominated the minds of British cotton and textile interests. 
 
Streat, and many of his contemporaries, did not seek to deny Japan a right to exist 
and trade. They readily acknowledged that Japan, like Great Britain, had to export to 
survive and that like it or not ‘Japan existed and would exist, with all its talents and 
its terrifyingly large population - still increasing’.33 An outlet was necessary. China 
was considered the rational market, but discounted through communist victory. At 
the very least that implied ‘acute discomforts for somebody’ exacerbated by 
American failure to understand the problems ‘posed by the proposition of Japan in a 
free world’.34 Streat sought to curtail Japan, and buy time for Lancashire's 
programme of domestic investment and modernisation, which he believed could 
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easily be undone through low-wage Japanese competition. It was imperative to 
convince the ‘capitalist and entrepreneur in the East that if he enlarged his bid for 
world trade to unreasonable proportions he would meet with such counter-action 
(import quotas or prohibitions) as to make his bid highly unprofitable’.35  
 
It is crucial to remember that Streat was not protesting simply against unfair 
Japanese trading practices, but against the sum total of potential Japanese trade in 
textiles (and other sectors too, such as shipping), regardless of its fairness. At an 
October 1954 meeting in London between Streat and Japan's conservative prime 
minister, Yoshida Shigeru (to whom Streat referred as ‘His squeaky little 
Excellency’), economic matters inevitably dominated the conversation. Yoshida 
observed that if Japan were to remain a bastion against the spread of communism, 
economic strength was essential. Unfair competition should be combated and 
solved, but fair competition was, quite simply, ‘fair’. In reply, Streat merely conceded 
the difficulties of competition were great, but in his diaries added ‘I left out the 
adjective [that is, fair] but I doubt if he observed the implication of the omission’.36 
 
In order to push forward the views of Lancashire, Streat vigorously lobbied not only 
the British and American governments, but also the Supreme Commander of Allied 
Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur directly. In this context, he represents 
a further dimension to UK-Japan economic and political relations beyond that of 
bureaucrats and politicians. In May 1950, Streat headed a joint Anglo-American 
Cotton Mission to Japan to assess his rivals in more detail and impress his concerns 
upon MacArthur.37 
 
MacArthur, initially suspicious of the joint mission, met Raymond Streat and Sir 
Alvary Gascoigne, head of the British Liaison Mission to Japan, on 8 May 1950. 
Perhaps forewarned of the General’s legendary ego, Streat slotted his own 
concerns within the larger framework of MacArthur’s profound impact on twentieth 
century history which might well ‘give a new moral and spiritual force to the eastern 
half of the world's population’.38 Acknowledging the need for economic growth to 
maintain Japan’s viability, Streat nonetheless spoke against exports for exports’ 
sake and explained that exporting goods rampantly would only attract hostility, lead 
to increased tariff barriers and thus detract from long-term economic growth. The 
purpose of his visit, therefore, was to ascertain the extent to which such principles 
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were understood and accepted, and how far Japanese intentions conformed to 
policies of ‘mutual respect and toleration’.39 MacArthur offered little. He did promise 
to eradicate unfair trade should it appear, but as to Sir Raymond's greater concern 
of the total volume of trade, rather than its fairness, no concessions were to be 
made. As Streat quoted MacArthur in early 1949, ‘Japan must either export to pay 
her way or the US taxpayer must keep Japan at his expense: what I want is more 
Jap goods sold anyhow they can be sold’.40 
 
Other than discomforting guided tours of Japanese mills which proved to be all too 
modern and efficiently managed, Streat gained little from his mission in terms of 
concrete assurances and promises to limit Japanese trade. This was not 
unexpected and matched his suspicions of limited sympathy for cotton in Whitehall 
and the press.41 In such beliefs Streat was, of course, almost entirely correct. 
 
London was, naturally, mindful of American policy for occupied Japan and the 
ramifications such policy held for economic relations between the Sterling Area and 
Japan. Inevitably, South-East Asian members of the Empire and Commonwealth 
figured in such calculations as Britain worked to balance the American alliance with 
its Commonwealth interests. The occupation of Japan began in August 1945. 
Although termed an Allied occupation, American interests usually over-ruled those 
of the allies who held limited and indirect powers to guide its course.42 SCAP’s initial 
aims were to demilitarise and democratise Japanese society and the economy. The 
Imperial Army and Navy were abolished, war-crime trials conducted and a purge of 
pre-war and war-time leaders enacted. Further, land was re-distributed, plans were 
drawn up to break the dominant industrial groupings, and a reparations programme 
was introduced to dismantle Japan's industrial might and shift it abroad to aid the 
industrialisation of the victims of Japanese war-time aggression. Not only would 
Japan's capacity to wage aggressive war be removed for all time, but so would the 
militarist and economic forces which promoted it in the first instance. However, over 
1948 and 1949, there appeared a gradual and irregular shift in the occupation as 
SCAP moved from reform to re-construction. This change is known as the ‘reverse 
course’ as the United States worked to re-develop the Japanese economy and 
prepare for Japan’s return to the international order as an American capitalist ally.43 
Urgency was accentuated by successful communist revolution in China and the 
Korean War; zaibatsu dissolution was watered down and reparation payments 
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ceased. Special procurement orders (tokuju) on behalf of United Nations forces 
fighting on the Korean peninsula from June 1950 to July 1953 led to Japan’s first 
post-war economic boom as orders and dollars flooded in.  
 
Korean War procurement visibly demonstrated Japan’s industrial capacity and its 
value as the key Asian ally in the Washington-led capitalist bloc. SCAP, and other 
American agencies, turned their attention to enlisting further Japanese economic 
might in the struggle against communism. South-East Asian markets and resources 
were essential to this process and the need to link the region with the Japanese 
economy was strongly emphasised. In October 1951, Kenneth Morrow, chief of 
SCAP’s Economic and Scientific Section's (ESS) Programs and Statistics Division, 
drew up a report outlining how Japan ‘as the most important workshop of the Far 
East [could] make its optimum contribution to the Free World’.44 Japan’s own 
economic growth would improve conditions throughout South-East Asia by 
increased productivity, production and the level of trade with Japan.45 In this 
manner, Japan could contribute to the regional economic battle against communism 
‘as the principal processing nation in the area’.46 The goal of Japanese economic 
development was clear given the extant model of Northeast Asia: ‘in the years 
before World War II nearly one fifth of Japan's exports to Korea and China were in 
the form of equipment and machinery necessary to produce raw materials 
contributory to Japan’s own development. This same kind of development must be 
repeated, this time in another part of the Far East’.47 To this end, joint SCAP-
Japanese missions toured through South and South-East Asia to promote Japanese 
access to raw material supplies and markets. A SCAP-prepared report of April 1950 
proudly explained that Japan held the ‘capacity to produce all types of the capital 
goods and equipment required...without impairment of her domestic economy’. 
Eagerly, the report projected Japanese exports to South-East Asia to exceed $710 
million by 1955.48 
 
Open American calls for a regional linking of the Japanese and South-East Asian 
economies continued over the 1950s.49 Inevitably, Great Britain’s interests, as 
witnessed by Sir Raymond Streat amongst many others, would suffer. However, it is 
unnecessarily simplistic to dismiss Britain as a desiccated imperial power too bereft 
of vision and will to design and implement policy for Japan and South-East Asia. In 
many instances, a controlled Japanese economic resurgence in South-East Asia 
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complemented British planning; American backing for these aims could be 
supportive as well as destructive. 
 
Official British policy sought to eradicate Japan’s ability to mobilise industrially for 
war but equally, as Sir Stafford Cripps, president of the Board of Trade, stated in 
October 1946, Japan must be left ‘internationally solvent’. The alternative was the 
need for 'permanent foreign support', which was clearly beyond the United 
Kingdom’s resources.50 Japan was held to be incapable of withstanding anything 
matching British economic policy for occupied Germany and any attempt to apply it 
would devastate the country, leading to impoverishment, unemployment and unrest. 
By way of contrast to initial SCAP and Washington planning for the Japanese 
economy, Great Britain actually appeared quite generous.51 Enlightened self-interest 
was clearly important, but concern that Japan not be economically crippled 
remained. In May 1948, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin spoke out against leaving 
Japan and its ‘ninety millions of people...in a cesspool of poverty’,a view that was 
supported by Sir Esler Dening, later head of the UK Liaison Mission in Japan.52 
 
British industry feared it, too, was heading for the cesspool and continued to press, 
via the Board of Trade, for the imposition of quotas and restraints upon Japan. 
Raymond Streat rejoined that Britain could not have full employment, social security 
and exports if Japan were free of restraints.53 In July 1948, a Lancashire delegation 
insisted upon seeing Bevin to demand that Japanese spindles be restricted to 3.5 
million, fewer than one-third the pre-war number. Bevin declined to see the 
delegation and made clear his views in a letter to Harold Wilson, president of the 
Board of Trade and important ally to Lancashire. Restrictions were beyond 
unacceptable; they were a ‘reversal of the policy towards Japanese industry hitherto 
advocated. On the grounds of economic principle, political possibility and 
administrative expediency, H.M. Government have always maintained that no 
proposal for restricting the development of Japanese consumption goods industries 
should be put forward’.54 
 
Without doubt, the ‘reverse course’ and the extent to which the United States was 
willing to remove Japan's economic fetters concerned the British government.55 
Nonetheless, it held firmly to the line that British industry would have to embrace 
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competition and survive through higher efficiency and more ‘derring-do’ in 
international markets.  
 
To explain the refusal to entertain industrial demands for protection, one cannot 
deny the overriding importance of the Anglo-American alliance to British policy. 
Over-antagonising the Americans could promote an outright assault on the sterling 
area and Britain's regional position to ensure Japanese economic penetration. Not 
only humiliating, such a step would have threatened Britain's own recovery given 
Malaya’s status as the major dollar earner of the sterling area. Further, it was 
increasingly apparent over 1949 that initial American hostility to the survival of the 
sterling area and British colonialism in Asia had waned and would even be reversed 
in the face of the United Kingdom’s imminent economic collapse. Washington 
understood the link between imperial and Commonwealth trade and the post-war 
recovery of the United Kingdom and hence its ability to resist communism in 
Western Europe. While the protectionist arrangements of the 1930s were rejected, 
America would nonetheless come to the assistance of Great Britain and the sterling 
area.56 Washington agreed to assist London in re-establishing the pre-war system of 
triangular trade whereby UK dollar deficits were partially balanced by surpluses in 
trade with Malaya and Malayan surpluses with the United States.57  
 
Growing American support for the sterling area aside, it is also true that by the end 
of the 1940s, Britain had independently come to acknowledge that domination of 
South-East Asia was no longer possible. Nonetheless, political and economic 
influence could be maximised through general intra-regional co-operation and 
economic growth. Such development would lead to new British markets and 
guarantee raw material supplies, with the huge dollar-earnings of Malayan natural 
rubber being the prime example. The corollary was the economic and social stability 
deemed essential if the region were to be successfully inoculated against the 
dangerous allures of communism. Inevitably, the problems were enormous. The 
colonial attitudes of European allies, namely the Netherlands and France, were 
regarded as more obstructive than enlightened. More importantly, Britain blatantly 
lacked the resources necessary to implement grandiose policies of aid and trade 
development.58 Attracting American interest and cash was of paramount 
importance. Though perhaps less emphatically, to many Japanese involvement was 
also desirable and more than likely inevitable, even if occasionally repugnant. 
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The 1949-50 sterling area trade agreement, itself a great expansion upon the 1948 
agreement, emphasised this point through permitting $400 million of Japanese-
sterling area trade.59 Similarly, Malcolm MacDonald, the Commissioner-General of 
the United Kingdom in South-East Asia 1948-55, strongly promoted these aims of 
expanded Anglo-Japanese trade in his capacity as commissioner-general and 
chairman of the Far Eastern Defence Co-ordination Committee. Other UK officials, 
such as Esler Dening, provided support from within Japan.  
 
The 1949 defeat of the Kuomintang in China confirmed in MacDonald’s mind the 
dangers posed by the spread of communism in Asia, and in May that year he 
returned to London to partake of an inter-departmental meeting with representatives 
from the Foreign, Colonial and Commonwealth Offices. MacDonald spoke 
emphatically on the danger of communist contagion. Success in China was but the 
beginning; he predicted most of Indo-china would fall within six months, then 
Thailand and Burma. With the buffers gone, Malaya and India would be left to face 
directly the communist threat. As a counter-measure, MacDonald proposed a 
regional political, economic and defence policy to convince South-East Asians of 
their own and Britain’s ability to resist.60 Allowing Japan a role could be deftly used 
to the advantage of the United Kingdom in its international relations with American, 
Japan and South-East Asia. 
 
MacDonald’s several visits to Japan and the annual regional conferences held at 
Bukit Serene and then Mallaig,61 make clear his concern for improved Japanese 
relations and trade. Japanese technical ability, consumer and capital goods, and 
even influence, were most likely a potential boon to the development and stability of 
South-East Asia. Japan’s return, therefore, ‘should be viewed with friendly 
understanding’.62  The gains for all were likely to be great. Japan must at all costs be 
kept within the capitalist camp and helped to avoid the economic and social decay, 
in addition to rising nationalism, born out of international isolation. By all accounts, 
MacDonald believed communism to be Japan’s greatest peril and stated there was 
a real danger that Tokyo would succumb to this threatening ideology by the early 
1960s. This would be an untenable ‘blow to our [British] security in the Pacific and in 
Asia’ in light of Japan's ‘strategic land area...the potential industrial power of this 
populous nation and...its energetic, efficient and aggressive military capacities’.63 
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The Foreign Office concurred in that Japan was a particularly important anti-
communist bastion to the UK and a possible threat to British Far Eastern colonial 
and economic assets should the communists take hold. That Japan be prosperous 
was of cardinal importance and it should be made plain to Tokyo that co-operation 
would be made worth its while.64 So important was retaining Japan for the free world 
that not only was a Japanese economic presence in South-East Asia made 
acceptable, it also became axiomatic that Japan should be pressed and aided to 
purchase even more in the region. Malayan iron ore and rubber were good 
examples.65 After all, one definite means of redressing the South-East Asian 
imbalance of trade with Japan was to increase the overall volume of trade and 
promote Japanese purchases in the region. 
 
Although they were not necessarily being asked, East Asians themselves were also 
expected to gain under this system. The expansion of trade would maintain the 
Japanese standard of living in addition to that of the poorer sections of the 
populations in South-East Asia who needed cheap consumer goods.66 Exposing 
their populations to the immediate gains derived from free trade within the capitalist 
bloc was the most effective means of denying communist propaganda a foothold in 
the region. MacDonald argued that economic suasion was a far more subtle means 
of winning hearts and minds than the Americans’ ready turn towards military 
solutions. An over-bearing Western military presence only made easier communist 
appeals to nationalism.67  
 
Finally, MacDonald argued that expanded regional trade with Japan was also to the 
greater benefit of British trade as a whole. Firstly, British territories would remain 
free of communism and thus open to British interests. Secondly, trade with Japan 
would increase the region’s standard of living, the purchasing power of the rather 
large populations, and therefore stimulate further the expansion of international 
trade from which Britain could not but gain.68 This vision would not be without its 
short-term costs to British industry, but echoing Whitehall and Westminster, 
MacDonald advised that manufacturers would do better to maintain quality, study 
special regional needs and improve upon delivery dates, than to demand 
protection.69 Others added their voices to MacDonald’s. The British Embassy in 
Thailand also supported a Japanese economic return to South-East Asia as 
valuable, and argued that the ‘long-term benefits of this prosperity will be reflected in 
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the long-term benefits to British trade’.70 The Treasury, too, sought to maximise 
trade between the colonial empire and Japan as, without doing so, Britain could 
‘hardly hope to induce her not to switch trade to the dollar area’.71 
 
Positive encouragement from MacDonald aside, to a very real degree Japanese 
imports into South-East Asia were needed to replace British exports. The United 
Kingdom's ill-affordable Korean War-led rearmament programme directed industrial 
production away from exportable consumer goods. Lancashire might have 
complained about Japanese textiles penetrating the Malayan market, but was 
frequently unable to fulfil local demand in any case. Equally, the costs of informal 
influence proved high, and over the early 1950s doubts arose as to Great Britain's 
ability to sustain the necessary effort into the future. Public funds soon proved 
insufficient to meet the needs of colonial investment programmes. Alternative 
private sources of capital failed to materialise in sufficient quantity as the City found 
more profitable avenues in Western Europe and North America than in grand plans 
for Empire and Commonwealth development. The Treasury, unconvinced of the 
economic grounds for colonial development, also in its way declined to prime the 
pump. For example, it proved highly unwilling to surrender ‘double taxation’ under 
which a UK company gained relief neither from UK income tax nor colonial 
government levies.72 Tellingly, from conception the Colombo Plan, regardless of its 
Commonwealth origins and symbolic value as evidence of United Kingdom 
commitment to colonial development, was reliant upon the United States for funds. 
From 1950-61, American aid to South-East Asia through the Colombo Plan totalled 
$8.3 billion in comparison to the UK sum of just £250 million over the same period.73 
In this context, de-colonisation and relative British decline also helped ease 
acceptance of the Japanese economic presence in South-East Asia. 
 
British sentiment towards Japan might thus appear rather benign, even indulgent. 
Malaya, Britain's dollar basket of the early Cold War, was apparently sufficiently 
juicy to share, textile and shipping industries could go on unprotected and Whitehall 
was imbued with the spirit of MacDonald’s ‘friendly understanding’.74 Inevitably, 
there is a need for caution. Despite a remarkable generosity, Britain maintained 
significant fears as to the depth and longevity of a potential Japanese economic 
assault on UK interests. The 1949 Dodge Plan for Japanese economic stabilisation 
is generally held to have pegged the yen at a slightly lower value than what was 
 
17
then held to be the most appropriate rate, with the aim of boosting Japan’s Asian 
and Pacific exports. While not nearly so apparent at the time, Britain and Australia 
were both, nonetheless, sufficiently concerned to defy intense American pressure 
and refused to agree to most-favoured-nation trading arrangements for Japan.75 
Indicative of long-term British fears, once more against powerful US pressure, 
London opposed Japanese admission to GATT until 1955. The Foreign Office was 
sufficiently wary of domestic opposition and feared that calls for protection would 
only increase as the Japanese economy grew. Further, the Commonwealth 
connexion preyed upon Whitehall's mind. New Zealand, Australia, South Africa and 
other colonies discriminated against Japan to the United Kingdom's advantage; if 
Great Britain scaled down its economic discrimination against the Japanese, it could 
tempt others to do likewise to even greater UK detriment.76 
 
In South-East Asia, too, Britain sought to temper an open-armed embrace with a 
narrower doorway. MacDonald might well have viewed Japan as being worth some 
‘calculated risks’77, but he always qualified his remarks. The British were not ‘going 
to be “mugs”’ and negotiate unfavourable agreements; nor would the Japanese be 
permitted to ‘advance their selfish interests to our own prejudice’.78  
 
Britain accepted a renewed Japanese presence, but on the proviso the 'process is 
gradual'.79 Graduality was often relatively easy to enforce. For example, when 
Japan's Kokan Mining Company requested permission to recommence activities at 
Malaya’s Temangan Mine, it was advised by British representatives that having UK 
and Malayan partners would increase their chances. Further, Commonwealth 
partners were to have a controlling interest, Japanese employees were not to 
exceed 100 (indicative of the mistrust in which the Japanese were held, to great 
relief 'any subversive activities...could be controlled by normal Special Branch 
methods’ and a one-third minimum of technicians had to hold a Commonwealth 
nationality).80 Other means were also available: visas could be restricted and in the 
case of Singapore commercial travellers were limited to one month; Malaya would 
admit no-one who had been resident prior to or during the War81 (Tokyo’s first 
nominated vice consul to Singapore, Oda Masakazu, was also rejected on these 
grounds82), and even the Raffles Hotel refused to accept bookings for Japanese 
consular officials in search of lodgings and offices on the ‘grounds that their staff 
would object strongly.’83 In South-East Asia, Britain was ‘at home’ to the Japanese, 
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but equally determined to retain the rights and will to exercise control over the 
nature of the visit. 
 
The world of the mid - to late - 1950s, however, was much changed even when 
compared to a mere five years previous. Weaponry and political developments 
rendered many colonial bases far less strategically useful than imagined. The 
Commonwealth shrank and became increasingly incohesive and impotent.  Burma 
left in 1948, and the Federation of Malaya gained internal self-government in 1955, 
as did Singapore in 1959. Increasingly, South-East Asians wrested control over 
economic decision-making from the British. The United Kingdom also looked to the 
United States and an incrementally uniting Western Europe as the key sources of 
economic prosperity and military security.  
 
ii) Conclusion 
The story of 1950s Anglo-Japanese trade and economic relations is not merely a 
story of balance sheets and figures. The perceptions and imageries held and 
employed by the British as the post-war economic relationship re-developed reveal 
much of how Great Britain viewed Japan and, even more, its own position in the 
new world order.  
 
Churchill’s placing of Britain at the very juncture of the ‘Three Circles’ itself speaks 
volumes on an elite unwilling to conceive of a less than central role in international 
affairs. This is not to say that awareness of overwhelming American power, 
projected both globally and within Japan, had not seeped into British consciousness. 
The 1956 Suez Crisis ensured that no British prime minister would again directly 
defy the wishes of the United States. Nevertheless, Britain could still seek to 
mediate and balance the two superpowers. Experience with a global empire, 
supposed diplomatic prowess, and lengthy familiarity with the Far East was meant to 
count for something. As the ditty has Lord Halifax whispering to Lord Keynes, ‘it's 
true they have the money bags, but we have all the brains’.84 
 
As a self-appointed tutor and mediator, Britain’s first task was to ‘encourage the 
Japanese in their present tendency to look to Great Britain as the greatest stabilising 
influence in international affairs’.85 This mission held as true for trade as for anything 
else. Through proper guidance, the Japanese could be educated out of their wicked 
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inter-war commercial habits and learn to partake responsibly in the international 
economy. Trade malpractices were intolerable, but entering into honest 
arrangements could help teach the Japanese to appreciate the obligations as well 
the benefits of international co-operation and provide instruction in the suitable 
standards of behaviour becoming to an important member of the Free World.86 
Benevolence could ease this process; not only would Japanese participation in 
South-East Asian trade be of monetary value, but Britain could encourage it before 
Japan had time ‘to reassume the garb of the truculent and embittered outcast’.87 
 
War-time bitterness also influenced British images of Japan with a resultant 
negative effect on economic relations. Stereotypes were reinforced and no doubt, 
sub-consciously or otherwise, guided policy makers and businessmen in their 
commercial dealings with Japan. Writing in 1950, Erick Pollock, a partner in 
Matheson & Co., felt as though the British were ‘still at war’, with negative attitudes 
towards the Japanese giving Britain the air of a vindictive nation, to its long-term 
economic cost.88 Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden spoke for many when he 
confessed ‘it is not easy to like the Japanese, but clearly they count for a great deal 
and will count for more’.89 Malcolm MacDonald, a man who saw himself as a good 
friend of the Japanese and keen to involve them in South-East Asian economic 
development, readily lapsed into stereotypes to support policy recommendations. 
Again, the ‘Japanese are an unsatisfactory people’, whose desire economically, if 
not politically, to dominate the Far East had been tempered merely by the enormity 
of defeat.90 Japanese characteristics had not changed and, in fact, one of the key 
reasons for their apparent susceptibility to communism was a liking for authoritarian 
rule (by the Right or Left, it mattered little lest the Japanese appear fussy), and the 
possession of a dictatorially authoritarian nature.91 With such honesty apparently 
being the basis of friendship, MacDonald added, ‘as friends of both the Americans 
and the Japanese we can make a considerable contribution to the solution of the 
problem between the Western democracies and Japan’.92 
 
Trading and economic relations between Great Britain, the Commonwealth and 
Empire and Japan over the 1950s thus succinctly demonstrate the problems facing 
the United Kingdom as it sought to affirm its position in the post-war economic and 
political order. The manner of Japan’s economic return to South-East Asia tells 
heavily of Britain’s limited ability to defy the United States and its unwillingness to 
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sacrifice the American alliance. The protectionist calls of British manufacturers were 
generally discounted and colonial economic links gradually withered. However, the 
retreat was neither chaotic nor immediate. British policy makers did envision a 
Japanese economic role in the region that flattered their own long-term interests in a 
managed withdrawal. To an extent, Whitehall and Westminster were able to limit 
and define the nature of Japanese economic activities in South-East Asia. 
Moreover, other markets and possibilities attracted British industry and finance away 
from empire and thus inevitably made room for Japanese involvement. Even so, 
British political influence was clearly eroded in East Asia and daily, the oscillations of 
the ‘Three Circles’ grew more difficult to synchronise. 
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Revisiting the 1980’s Textbook Issue in Japan: 
 Reactions in China, South Korea and Other Asian Countries 
 
Mutsumi Hirano 
 
The issue of history continues to be important in Japan’s relations with Asian 
countries.1 In this context, this paper aims to provide an overall picture of the 
Japanese history textbook disputes with China and South Korea in 1982 and 1986, 
and the repercussions of these diplomatic rows in Asia and beyond.2 The paper also 
sheds light on governmental dialogue and transnational aspects of the textbook 
issue.3 The main cause of the disputes concerned the content of Japanese history 
textbooks, specifically, accounts of Japan’s colonial rule and aggression in Asia 
before and during the Second World War. The disputes also highlighted the standard 
practice of textbook authorisation in the country known as ‘textbook screening’. 
According to this practice, the Ministry of Education of Japan (MOE) examines in 
detail all textbooks of elementary and secondary schools; only textbooks approved 
by the Ministry are permitted for use in either public or private schools.4 The 
screening system arguably serves the purpose of censorship since the MOE can 
demand that textbook authors rewrite the text or part of it before approval is 
accorded. Below, the paper will review the 1982 and 1986 disputes and then 
describe public and regional reactions. 
 
1. The First Textbook Dispute in 1982 
The New York Times branded the 1982 textbook dispute as ‘the worst diplomatic 
quarrels’ in Japan’s relations with China and South Korea in a long time.5 It was 
triggered by the Japanese media, namely television programmes aired on the 
evening of 25 June and newspapers of the next day. According to their reports, the 
Education Ministry rewrote historical accounts in textbooks in the process of textbook 
authorisation. Despite the news media’s initial ‘misreport’, the crucial fact is that the 
MOE did give textbook authors either compulsory instructions or recommendations 
(which are practically difficult to distinguish from each other in some cases) so that 
the term ‘aggression’, which would have been used otherwise, might be avoided.6  
The official Chinese news agency Xinhua’s initial coverage (26 June) was cautious,7 
followed by more explicit criticism in the Communist Party newspaper Renmin Ribao 
(People’s Daily) on 30 June.8  
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At this stage, however, the MOE hardly anticipated that the results of textbook 
certification would develop into a full-fledged diplomatic row. In fact, for about a 
month, the Japanese government’s response was non-existent, despite the fact that 
the media in both China and South Korea were giving the issue intensive coverage.9  
Education Minister Ogawa Heiji simply asserted that textbook screening was fair and 
impartial and that it was an internal affair.10 In the meantime, outspoken Japanese 
Cabinet members’ comments sparked a controversy at home and abroad.11 
 
Diplomatic exchanges 
The focus of Chinese and South Korean criticism shifted later onto Japan’s 
responsibility for its colonial rule and aggression in Asia-Pacific. The starting (and 
ever-consistent) point of both governments’ protests was that the Education Ministry, 
and ultimately the Japanese government, was responsible for the glossing-over of 
historical facts in school textbooks and that these wrong accounts had to be 
corrected. The Tokyo government slowly responded to the situation this dispute 
created, first with a mixture of stopgap measures and a wait-and-see attitude, and 
finally by hammering out domestic procedures aimed at settling the dispute.12 
 
The Chinese Foreign Ministry first protested that the textbook screening in question 
was not conducted in accordance with the spirit of the Sino-Japanese Joint 
Statement of 1972 (26 July).13  The main points of the Japanese government’s reply 
(28 July) were: 
The Japanese government’s view on the past war, as clearly stated in the 
preamble of the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement, has not changed.  
 
It is that Japan had inflicted serious damage on Chinese people during the 
war, and that it is keenly aware of its responsibility for the damage and deeply 
reproaches itself; and 
 
This view should be reflected in Japanese education and the Japanese 
government will humbly listen to the Chinese government’s claim.14 
 
However, Beijing unequivocally referred to the controversial contents in the textbooks 
as ‘errors’, labelling as ‘preposterous’ the deletion of accounts of the heinous deeds 
during the occupation of China.15 The Chinese message was clear: 
In censoring the textbooks for primary and secondary schools, the Japanese 
Ministry of Education tampered with the history of the Japanese militarist 
aggression against China by changing ‘invasion of north China’ to ‘advance 
into north China’....  What is more, it even attributed the Nanjing atrocities 
during the war to ‘the stubborn resistance of the Chinese troops, which 
inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese army, who were enraged and, as a 
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result, killed many Chinese soldiers and civilians’.  This is an obvious distortion 
of the historical facts and is therefore unacceptable.16   
 
Although Seoul’s initial response appeared rather restrained,17 its Education Ministry 
disclosed instructions that Korean historians examine Japanese textbooks closely, 
and that countermeasures would be taken after the investigation.18 A Foreign Ministry 
source also indicated that South Korea would offer detailed programmes to ‘help’ 
Japan to rectify its historical accounts and to improve mutual understanding between 
the two peoples.19 Its officials stressed that ‘the ultimate goal.was to have Japan 
correct its errors’ in the textbooks.20  But the MOE’s communication with South Korea 
(30 July) does not seem to indicate any progress. 
The MOE makes efforts so that textbook contents may be appropriate, and will 
pay attention to South Korean interests and humbly listen to its domestic 
debate. 
 
The Japanese government’s involvement in textbook screening is limited to 
the extent that it gives advice.  The final decision on accounts in textbooks is 
left to private authors and publishers. 
 
Textbook screening takes into account the remorse of the past relations and 
the spirit of bilateral friendship.  This policy will remain intact in school 
education and textbook screening.21 
 
A few days later, Seoul’s first formal protest was conveyed to Japanese Ambassador 
Maeda Toshikazu in the form of a memorandum (3 August). The Main Points of the 
South Korean Memorandum: 
 
It is very regrettable that neither the Japanese government’s response of 30 
July nor the Japanese Ministry of Education’s explanation offered any 
concrete suggestion about the correction of the Japanese textbooks, which 
the South Korean government demanded. 
 
The Japanese government’s attitude further agitated Korean public opinion 
and feeling, and it is seriously concerned that the situation, if continued, would 
adversely affect friendly South Korean-Japanese relations. 
 
The South Korean government strongly demands that the Japanese 
government take swift and concrete corrective measures.22   
 
At last, Japanese government officials began to realise the extent of foreign 
antagonism which seemed to flare up everywhere.23 In Taiwan, Hongkong, North 
Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam and 
elsewhere, either the government, the press or civilian groups voiced their 
condemnation of the controversial textbooks.  After the official South Korean protest, 
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Prime Minister Suzuki, for the first time, expressed his concern over the dispute—but 
this was mixed with surprise—given Japan’s postwar efforts to become a peace-
loving nation.24 At the second protest, the Chinese government reiterated their 
previous points (5 August).25 
 
In early August, the Japanese government attempted to dispatch a special delegation 
to China and South Korea in order to make inquiries into their views on this issue. 
But Seoul rejected the Japanese mission on the grounds that Tokyo’s attempt at 
soliciting understanding from Seoul, without any indication of immediate corrections, 
would be unproductive.26 Yet, if this issue remained unsettled, anti-Japanese feelings 
threatened to sweep both neighbours, and even Prime Minister Suzuki’s visit to 
China was in jeopardy along with talks with South Korea over loan issues. Its 
parliament passed a resolution urging Japan to make swift corrections.27  The South 
Korean Education Minister, Rhee Kyu-do, also announced a modification of the 
history curriculum for their junior and senior high schools for the next academic year, 
with a view to teaching students more about Japan’s invasion (6 August).28 
 
Prime Minister Suzuki finally decided to accept Chinese and South Korean demands 
in principle and agreed to the amendment of the controversial accounts in some form 
(7 August).  However, his very first official comment since the onset of the dispute 
was hardly concrete and substantive (8 August).29 A fuller statement was made by 
Foreign Minister Sakurauchi Yoshio (12 August), which seems to have been 
prepared for announcement prior to Liberation Day of 15 August in South Korea, 
where anti-Japanese feelings had been growing.30  In fact, the Seoul government had 
earlier pressured Japan to clarify its commitment to the amendment of the textbooks 
before this particular day.31 
 
In parallel, Prime Minister Suzuki, Foreign and Education Ministers were considering 
a two-step approach based on the report of an earlier mission to Beijing.32  The two-
step approach (13 August) was basically aimed at separating the issue of diplomatic 
relations from the issue of the textbook screening system. In practical terms, this 
meant that: 1) the Japanese government would clarify its responsibility for the war 
and express its remorse over past conduct in the form of a statement by the Prime 
Minister and 2) it would persuade China and South Korea to leave the correction of 
the textbooks to Japan.33 
 
 31
Furthermore, two members of the Liberal Democratic Party flew to Seoul in a last-
minute attempt to assuage public anger (22 August), as university students were 
about to return from their summer vacations.34  It was essential for the Japanese 
government, regardless of the effectiveness of the mission, to be seen as 
cooperating with South Korean authorities, which were themselves seeking to stem 
the momentum of direct public action.35  
 
About the same time, Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa Kiichi confirmed the 
Japanese government’s intention to make necessary amendments to the textbooks 
but he stopped short of saying that it would do so along the lines suggested by 
foreign governments (21 August).36 This confirmation was soon followed by the Prime 
Minister’s announcement at a press conference (23 August).  However, his statement 
included a very controversial point which undermined the very purpose of his 
statement:  
...judgement on its prewar conduct should wait until historians of the future 
generation make their judgement.  But it is a fact that the war is internationally 
criticised and acknowledged as ‘aggression’, and the Japanese government 
should acknowledge this fact fully.37 
 
The Japanese government finally announced some corrective measures in the form 
of the Miyazawa Statement (26 August). The Chief Cabinet Secretary expressed his 
confidence in it, commenting that this statement, coupled with the MOE’s 
explanation, would remove any ambiguity over the government’s stance.38 
 
A Summary of the Miyazawa Statement:  
The Japanese government and people, keenly aware of the sufferings and 
damage which Japan inflicted on the peoples of Asian countries including 
South Korea and China, have followed the path of a peace-loving nation, 
determined not to repeat the past deeds.  
 
There is no change in the understanding of the South Korean-Japanese Joint 
Communiqué of 1965 and the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement of 1972. 
 
The spirit of these statements should be reflected in school education and in 
textbook screening in Japan. 
 
The Japanese government will listen to overseas criticisms about Japanese 
textbooks and it will be responsible for correcting textbooks which were 
criticised by South Korea, China and so on. 
  
Japan will endeavour to promote mutual understanding and friendly and 
cooperative relations with neighbouring countries, while contributing to peace 
and stability in Asia and the world.39 
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Towards a settlement of the dispute 
Beijing’s response was a virtual rejection of the Miyazawa Statement. By contrast, 
Seoul accepted it in principle,40 although dissatisfied with the timing of the 
corrections. According to diplomatic sources in Seoul, South Korea was more 
inclined to put its relations with Japan back on track and continue efforts to settle the 
textbook row in order to avoid exciting its public opinion further.41  
 
The Main Points of the South Korean Government’s Statement 
The South Korean government considers that the promise made by the 
Japanese government to correct accounts in Japanese textbooks is an 
affirmative response to its repeated demands and to Korean public opinion on 
this matter. 
 
As for the timing of the corrections, it falls far short of expectations, especially 
that controversial accounts in the approved textbooks will not be corrected 
until 1985. 
 
However, the South Korean government notes the fact that the Japanese 
government has promised to take interim steps in classroom instructions so 
that the issues and criticisms raised by the Korean public may be reflected.  
 
The government will continue diplomatic efforts to see to it that the Japanese 
government’s promise will be put into practice at an early date. 
 
The government believes that a correct understanding of the history of 
Korean-Japanese relations is fundamental to the establishment of friendly and 
cooperative bilateral relations on the principles of reciprocity, equality and 
mutual respect. 42 
 
 However, this official view was far from that of Korean public opinion which 
demanded an immediate settlement of the dispute.43 In fact, Seoul’s initial 
acceptance of ‘an affirmative response’ appeared as if it would be held back for 
another week until Tokyo announced the next step (6 September).44 In early 
September, First Assistant Foreign Minister Gong Ro-myung disclosed that South 
Korea would make more specific requests for amendments concerning the ‘comfort 
women’, the suppression of Korean independence movements and the ban on the 
Korean language.45 The Seoul government was drafting a list of corrections on the 
basis of research conducted by the Korean National History Compilation Committee 
(the final version of the list was sent to Tokyo on 27 September). The study pointed 
out 167 inaccurate accounts in Japanese textbooks covering ancient to modern 
history.46 According to a South Korean Foreign Ministry official, Seoul requested the 
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correction of 39 items.47 It also proposed joint research efforts between the two 
countries in order to correct biased views.48 In response to the South Korean list, 
Education Minister Ogawa stated that the Japanese government would make its own 
decisions about textbooks.49 Eventually, the MOE conceded that it would amend the 
accounts of four out of the 13 events on the list which were designated for immediate 
correction.50 
 
For its part, the Chinese government’s strong dissatisfaction with the Miyazawa 
Statement was immediately conveyed at a meeting between Vice-Foreign Minister 
Wu Xueqian and Japanese Ambassador Katori Yasue (28 August). 
 
The Chinese Government’s Reply to the Miyazawa Statement  (Excerpts) 
Having studied the content of the statement, the Chinese government 
maintains that though the Japanese government said it would listen fully to 
criticisms and be responsible for correcting the relevant passages in the 
textbooks, yet it did not put forward any satisfying clear-cut and concrete 
measures to make corrections. The Japanese government’s attitude falls far 
short of the demands of the Chinese side.  It is rather disappointing. The 
Chinese people cannot agree and the Chinese people also cannot accept it.  
 
We do not agree that the Japanese government need not take resolute 
measures to correct the textbook mistakes on the excuse of defending the 
textbook screening system. 
 
The Chinese government once again urges the Japanese government to take 
concrete, effective measures and correct as quickly as possible the mistakes 
in screening the textbooks by the Ministry of Education so as to reach a 
satisfying solution of the matter.  That would be conducive to the development 
of Sino-Japanese relations.51 
 
In response to the Chinese rejection of the Miyazawa Statement and the renewed 
South Korean push for immediate corrections, the Japanese government announced 
a reworked implementation plan which included a timetable for enacting changes and 
guidelines for informing all schools of the corrections (6 September). Two days later, 
Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Wu announced a reply:  
Though there are still some ambiguous, unsatisfactory points about the 
concrete measures proposed by the Japanese side this time to correct the 
mistakes, it is a step forward compared with previous explanations.  
We will judge whether the Japanese side conscientiously corrects the 
mistakes in the textbooks by its concrete actions and their effects.  We reserve 
our right to comment on this matter.  We hope the Japanese government will 
continue its efforts, respect historical facts and keep its word in the interests of 
the continued development of Sino-Japanese relations.52 
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The Japanese government’s new arrangements were finally accepted by both the 
Chinese and South Korean governments on 9 September. For the first time, Vice-
Foreign Minister Wu signalled an end to the controversy, though ‘a temporary 
close’.53 On the same day, the Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary stated that a 
diplomatic end to the dispute was achieved.54  
 
Domestic arrangements in Japan 
On 14 September, the MOE initiated the first meeting of the Textbook Authorisation 
Research Council (TARC) in order to examine the existing screening standards 
concerning history textbooks and other relevant matters. Eventually, the scope of 
consultation to the TARC was narrowed down to the following three points:  
History textbooks only: If the implications of the textbook issue are considered, 
junior high school textbooks for civics studies, geography and the Japanese 
language will also have to be examined along with history textbooks.  But, only 
history textbooks will be examined; 
 
Asian countries only: Accounts concerning not only China and South Korea 
but also other Asian countries will be reviewed. National feelings of other 
Asian countries will be hurt if the range of accounts to be examined is limited 
to the two countries.  But a review of all countries in the world is too far-
reaching. Therefore, a review will include historical accounts on Asian 
neighbours where Japan’s war conduct directly inflicted damage; and 
 
Modern and contemporary periods only: Especially accounts dealing with 
modern and contemporary periods will be examined.55    
 
Although these points appeared to suggest that fairly concrete measures would 
result, the Council’s final proposal to the MOE (16 November) failed to recommend 
any amendments to procedural matters or to provide any specific examples of 
necessary corrections.56 
 
A Summary of the Final Proposal 
History textbooks must be written from objective and fair standpoints as far as 
circumstances permit. With regard to modern and contemporary history, there 
is much to be done in the sorting of historical materials and the accumulating 
of research achievements. Furthermore, the interpretation of individual events 
and phenomena is not necessarily settled; hence, it needs careful 
consideration.  
Needless to say, Japan, as a peace-loving country, should consider a spirit of 
international understanding and international cooperation. In particular, it is 
necessary to take into account the national feelings of each country in 
describing Japan’s relations with neighbouring Asian countries such as South 
Korea and China because of its unfortunate relations with them in the past. 
 
 35
This consideration should be respected even further than previously in 
textbook screening.57  
 
Furthermore, a final statement announced by the Education Minister (24 November) 
fell far short of identifying detailed amendments to be made in the future, and it was 
even less substantive than the above proposal.58 The statement was virtually a 
review of the dispute.59   
 
However, with the statement, the MOE completed its domestic arrangements relating 
to the 1982 dispute. As a result of all these intergovernmental exchanges, the 
Japanese textbook screening standards were modified under foreign pressure for the 
first time since the introduction of the new education system after the war. To be 
precise, a new clause stipulating the spirit of international understanding and 
international cooperation was added to those already existing screening standards. It 
was completely different from the old criteria in that it took foreign relations into 
consideration.60 At least, an institutional foothold was established and a South Korean 
Foreign Ministry source evaluated the new textbook screening standard in a positive 
manner.61 However, the most important point—the individual cases of corrections—
was left out in all official statements.  None of the resulting corrective arrangements 
were intended to be binding; individual changes were left to the discretion of textbook 
authors and teachers at school.62 Ironically, this autonomy was what Japanese 
educationalists had long sought. It seems clear that the Japanese authorities dealt 
with the dispute by hiding behind the technicalities of the screening system at its 
earlier stage, and closed it by again using the same tactic. Very few government 
officials seriously examined the background factors of the dispute. 
 
2. The Second Textbook Dispute in 1986 
After the first dispute, most highlighted words such as ‘invasion’ were approved by 
the MOE without any comments in textbook authorisation. However, the South 
Korean Education Ministry expressed strong dissatisfaction with the results of the 
1983 textbook screening and indicated that it was considering a further step.63 The 
next year, Xinhua News Agency reported that, while there had been improvements, 
the text which resulted from the screening remained unsatisfactory.64 The Japanese 
Foreign Ministry itself noted Chinese criticisms of the 1984 screening.65 It was 
reported that the MOE obviously did not touch particular words which had drawn 
attention in 1982, but, on the whole, examined the text more strictly than before.66 
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As expected by some observers, a second textbook dispute arose. When it was 
revealed that a new Japanese history textbook had been passed despite the 
inclusion of a number of explanations contrary to historical facts, the initial reaction in 
China as well as in South Korea was that ‘the Japanese have done it again’. Their 
accusations were essentially the same as those made in 1982, though their protests 
were relatively low-key. This seems to be partly because the diplomatic framework 
for handling this issue was laid out in the first dispute. This time, the focus was on the 
domestic arrangements for the correction of one particular high school history 
textbook, Shimpen Nihonshi (New Edition: Japanese History). It was compiled by a 
right-wing group called ‘Nihon o Mamoru Kokumin Kaigi’ (the National Conference for 
the Defence of Japan).67 The Japanese government was forced to deal directly with 
this private group. 
 
To an extent, the 1986 dispute was a result of the first controversy, because the 
National Conference planned to compile its own history textbook in the wake of the 
1982 dispute. At their meeting in Tokyo in late October in 1982, the group agreed 
that the writing of textbooks was too important a project to be entrusted to left-
oriented scholars, as had been the case in the past. They decided to take on the task 
of producing textbooks for Japanese people as they saw fit, instead of complaining 
about teaching materials written by other scholars.68 In March 1984, the National 
Conference asked a former Chief Textbook Examiner of the MOE to supervise and 
edit a Japanese history textbook for high schools.69  
 
When the Second Division of the TARC (in charge of social studies) examined the 
first draft of the textbook in question in late January 1986, the decision to approve 
was split and only ‘a conditional pass’ was given at this stage. et the arrangement for 
reexamination itself was exceptional. When the authors and editors of the textbook 
received the results of the examination (20 March), there were a total of 420 either 
compulsory or recommended corrections to be made. After a lengthy discussion 
which took place between the MOE and the authors, the Social Studies Division 
approved the changes made in the final draft (30 May). Individual MOE textbook 
examiners were anxious about how neighbouring countries would react to the 
approval of the textbook. 
 
Their concerns proved right. A leading Korean newspaper took up the history 
textbook compiled by the overtly nationalist group (30 May). Its editorial said that 
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Japan should not forget the past and should prevent Japanese arrogance from 
developing once again into imperialism.70 One after another Chinese and Korean 
newspaper articles appeared, which denounced the textbook (for example, Korean 
Herald, from 1 June onwards and China Daily, from 5 June onwards). 
 
A South Korean Foreign Ministry official announced that they were launching an 
investigation into the accounts relating to Korea in the textbook (6 June). The Foreign 
Ministry said that it would ‘carefully watch’ Japan’s reaction (7 June).71 However, 
South Korea did not lodge any official protest this time. Its diplomats confined their 
strong expressions of anger to private channels.72 In the meantime, Seoul’s senior 
officials’ comments were given extensive press coverage.73 The Education Ministry 
reiterated its concerns over long-standing points of controversy concerning Japanese 
colonialists’ recruitment of Koreans for forced labour, the imposition of Japanese 
names, the compulsory worship of Shinto and the expropriation of Korean farmland, 
none of which were mentioned in the textbook. The Ministry also accused the 
textbook writers of justifying the annexation of Korea in 1910.74 
 
For their part, the Chinese authorities launched an official protest (4 June), though 
their reactions were more restrained than in 1982, and the Chinese press remained 
surprisingly quiet over the issue.75 Raising questions about the descriptions of the 
Nanjing Massacre and other incidents, Ma Yuzhen (a Chinese Foreign Ministry 
spokesman) said at a weekly news briefing:   
Both in the past and at present, we have always been, and will continue to be 
in the future, opposed to any statements and actions that distort historical 
facts and prettify the war of aggression.76  
 
In their second protest, the Chinese Foreign Ministry took a harder line and 
demanded that Japan swiftly rectify the proposed high school textbook that ‘grossly 
distorts’ the facts regarding the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-45 (7 June).77 Xinhua 
News Agency pointed out that not a word was mentioned of the aggressive policies 
of the Japanese militarists in the textbook.78 According to the China Daily, the 
textbook interpreted what Japan had done in the early 20th century as necessary in 
order to ‘liberate Asia from the rule of European and American powers and to build a 
Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere’.79   
 
In response to this Chinese protest, Education Minister Kaifu Toshiki stated that the 
MOE had examined teaching materials in view of friendly neighbourly relations and 
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that the final results of the screening to be announced in early July should be awaited 
(10 June).80 However, because its basic stand on the textbook issue had not changed 
since the previous dispute, the Japanese government merely repeated to China the 
same explanation of the textbook screening system, and conveyed that the new 
screening standard was applied.81 
 
During the course of these exchanges, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro decisively 
intervened in the dispute. He told the MOE to reexamine the controversial textbook 
on at least two occasions, following Chinese demands that Japan observe the 
Miyazawa Statement. Consequently, the MOE instructed the National Conference to 
make corrections four times after the official approval was given (30 May), until the 
final corrections were accepted (5 July).82 On the whole, the Japanese government 
coped more deftly with the row under Nakasone’s leadership than had been the case 
previously. The MOE was also more cooperative this time, although only after coming 
under foreign pressure.  
 
The Foreign Ministry remained suspicious of the partial amendment to the 
nationalistic tone of the textbook despite extraordinary measures taken by the MOE. 
The MOFA raised its concerns that the problems surrounding the textbook issue 
would recur in the future.83 Some quarters in the Ministry voiced concern that the 
situation would be far worse than the 1982 case, if the final results of the screening 
were found not to be in accordance with the Miyazawa Statement. In addition, Prime 
Minister Nakasone’s comments on the issue raised foreign expectations. The MOFA 
applied informal pressure on the MOE stating that Japan had to avoid being 
questioned about its foreign policy stance.84 Despite its alleged ‘wait and see 
attitude’, the Foreign Ministry reportedly asked or pressed the group to withdraw the 
publication of the textbook in late June in order not to undermine Japan’s diplomatic 
efforts in the postwar period.85  
 
The Japanese Government’s Domestic Arrangements during the 1986 Dispute 
  
6 June: Prime Minister Nakasone instructs Education Minister Kaifu to handle 
the issue carefully based on the Miyazawa Statement. 
 
Between 8 June and 10 June: The MOE asks the authors of the textbook to 
make corrections (e.g. to change the explanation of An Jung-gun from ‘a 
ruffian’ to ‘a leader’ and to restore the word ‘massacre’ to the account of the 
Nanjing Atrocities). The MOE solicits the textbook authors to pretend that 
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these corrections had been instructed before the official approval on 30 May 
and to keep this matter secret. 
 
13 June: The Prime Minister again instructs the Education Minister to consider 
the matter carefully. 
 
18 June: The Prime Minister instructs Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotoda to 
handle the situation. The MOE makes the second request for corrections of 
the accounts related to China and Korea 
 
27 June: The MOE makes the third request for corrections. It indicates clear 
examples pointed out by the Chinese newspaper People’s Daily and the 
Korean Education Ministry (e.g. as to China, the Manchurian Incident, the 
Sino-Japanese War, the Nanjing Massacre; as to South Korea, the March First 
Demonstration against Japanese rule, the killings of Korean residents in 
Japan after the Great Earthquake in the Kanto Area, and the Kokato Incident).  
 
2 July: The MOE asks the twenty members of the Social Studies Division of 
the TARC to approve the corrections. 
 
3 July: The Chairman of the Steering Committee of the National Conference 
agrees to about 30 corrections such as the account of changing foreigners’ 
indigenous names to Japanese names. The MOE makes the fourth demand 
for corrections, including the issue of the Emperor. 
 
4 July:-A negotiation over remaining arrangements is held between the MOE 
and the editor of the textbook (former Chief Textbook Examiner of the MOE) 
who, for the first time, appears in public on this issue.  As a result, the 
negotiation is completed.  
 
7 July: The MOE reports the final corrections to the TARC and seeks its 
approval. The MOE gives a final approval to the textbook. 
 
After the final approval of the controversial textbook (7 July), the MOE explained that 
the Education Minister was entitled to take measures outside the regular procedures 
in a special situation involving foreign countries.86 A government source revealed that 
Foreign and Education Ministers and the Chief Cabinet Secretary agreed to reject the 
textbook if the group did not follow the MOE’s instructions.87 The Prime Minister also 
conceded that corrections were being made to comply with the views of Cabinet 
Ministers including himself.  He explained that, in the case of textbooks dealing with 
sensitive aspects of international relations, the Japanese government had to abide by 
its promise to respect the spirit of the joint statements with China and South Korea, 
as stipulated in the Miyazawa Statement.88   
 
The Japanese government’s contact with China and South Korea, after an 
extraordinary postponement of approval, revealed that its continental neighbours 
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remained unhappy. When Japanese Ambassador to South Korea Mikanagi Kiyohisa 
informed the Seoul government of the final results (7 July), the South Korean Foreign 
Ministry replied that the revisions were not complete, although acknowledging 
Japan’s efforts. According to a South Korean official, the textbook made no mention 
of Japanese colonial policies which aimed at erasing the features of traditional 
Korean culture.89 Kwon Byong-hyun (Director-General for Asian Affairs of the Foreign 
Ministry) noted that the explanations about the detailed processes leading to the 
annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 fell far short of being satisfactory.90 Foreign 
Minister Lee Won-kyung and Culture and Information Minister Lee Won-hong stated 
that Seoul would continue to pressure Tokyo to remove accounts which glossed over 
historical facts.91 
 
Beijing also regarded the final version of the textbook as inadequate.92  According to 
a Foreign Ministry spokesman, the textbook lacked the recognition of the basic facts 
about Japanese militarists’ actions in neighbouring countries and of their 
responsibility for these deeds.93  Vice-Foreign Minister Liu Shuqing also conveyed to 
the Japanese Ambassador to China, Nakae Yosuke, that the textbook did not have ‘a 
sound keynote’.94  
 
By this time, presumably in order to avoid further diplomatic embarrassment and 
international attention, the Japanese Foreign Ministry attempted to close the book on 
this issue.95 Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotoda Masaharu commented that the 
screening of textbooks was a domestic matter and that the MOE had made sincere 
efforts to observe the 1982 statement (17 July).96 In the meantime, the second 
textbook row practically disappeared from the news agenda despite no clear 
indication from either Beijing or Seoul that it had been resolved. 
 
In the end, the second textbook row was left unresolved. Despite the seemingly 
sophisticated handling of the dispute, Japanese officials failed to address the 
fundamental question of why the MOE had approved the controversial textbook in the 
first place. This problem could not be solved by dismissing one Education Minister, 
who rekindled the dispute shortly thereafter by making controversial remarks about 
the annexation of Korea, and by making amendments to one particular textbook. 
 
3. Public Reactions in China, South Korea and Japan during the 
1982 and 1986 Disputes 
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One of the distinctive characteristics of the 1982 and 1986 disputes is that they were 
not confined to the intergovernmental level. Both Beijing and Seoul underlined their 
nationals’ indignation, and the physical and mental suffering which they had 
experienced at the hands of the Japanese and which continues today. However, it is 
difficult to conclude anything specific about Chinese, Korean or Japanese public 
reactions from their governments’ formal statements. Therefore, this section will 
focus on the repercussions among ordinary people in these three countries and 
illustrate the transnational nature of the issue.  
 
Given tight government control over news and civic activities in China and South 
Korea, some inference must be made between the government’s use of the press 
and the officially sanctioned freedom of public speech and activities.97 However, it 
was not merely diplomatic manoeuvring that both governments sought to emphasise 
the concerns of their people, which might otherwise have been ignored by the Tokyo 
government. On this occasion, both Chinese and South Korean governments’ 
publicity exercises were firmly backed by public support. As a Dietman rightly pointed 
out, the political settlement of the textbook row with Beijing and Seoul governments 
would not satisfy the people of both countries, nor the Japanese.98 
 
Official Chinese newspapers introduced public views in the form of letters to the 
editor. These included stories of personal ordeals and witnesses to the brutality of 
Japanese troops as well as critical comments by school teachers and historians. Yet 
one cannot deny the impression that opinions quoted were somewhat reworked 
versions of the Communist Party’s statements. It is difficult to assess the genuine 
extent and depth of public debate beyond the official lines; but it can be said that the 
Beijing government gave vent to Chinese people’s ‘strong resentment’ against the 
change from ‘aggression’ to ‘advance’, as Xia Yan (Vice-President of the China-
Japan Friendship Association) expressed.99 In Chinese academic circles, which 
severely reproached the Japanese education authorities, Xu Deheng (a Chinese 
sociologist) said that the MOE was ‘blaming the victims’.100 Another academic, Wan 
Feng (Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Society of Japanese History) contended that 
‘this clumsy trick’ would not deceive either the Chinese or the Japanese people.101  
Other individuals like Bai Xiqing (President of the Chinese Medical Association) 
publicly spoke of the bacteriological experiments conducted in Harbin and other 
provinces in Northeast China by the Unit 731 of the Japanese Army between 1940 
and 1944.102 
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South Korean citizens, with their long-standing antagonism towards their former 
rulers, were a powerful voice of support for their government’s escalating protests.103  
Among those who launched protest rallies across the country were groups of South 
Korean survivors who had witnessed Japanese troops’ savagery. Anti-Japanese 
demonstrations erupted almost daily in the capital from the onset of the 1982 
dispute.104 Taxi drivers, restaurants, department stores and shops refused Japanese 
customers and citizens called for the boycott of Japanese imports.105 Korean 
employees of Japanese banks in Seoul were particularly in a delicate position; they 
held a rally in response to criticisms that they worked for Japanese companies.106  
 
Some of South Korean Public Protests and Campaigns in 1982 
 
Civic organisations’ rallies 
The Korea Independence Fighters’ Association 
The Korean Federation of Education Association 
The Korean Nuclear Bomb Victim’s Association 
The Korean Senior Citizens Association107   
 
Student rallies and demonstrations 
Korea University (9 September), Seoul National University (15 September), 
Yonsei University (21 September) and Seogang University (27 September)108  
 
In Japan 
The Korean Residents Union in Japan (Mindan) (29 July) 109 
 
In the 1982 dispute, the press and major political parties and organisations in South 
Korea took a tougher stance towards Japan than the government did.110 Foreign 
diplomatic sources analysed that Seoul’s turnaround from a wait-and-see attitude to 
a hardline stance was due to ever-mounting Korean public anger against Tokyo’s 
‘smoke-screen tactics’.111 
 
Korean scholars had plenty of ammunition to aim at the textbook issue. Regarding 
the ‘legacy’ of Japan’s rule over Korea, Lee Jin-hee (a Korean historian living in 
Japan) maintained that, because Japanese history textbooks were laced with a 
colonial view of history, Japanese people tended to believe Korea to be ‘a weak 
country’, which frequently suffered foreign invasions, ‘a trivial people’, ‘a country 
underdeveloped and barbarous’ and ‘a miserable country’.112 According to Shing 
Yong-ha (professor at Seoul National University), Japan’s views about Korean 
independence movements and the independent state of Korea after National 
Liberation defied the Korean people’s feelings.113  Similarly, Kim Hak-joon (professor 
at the same university) drew attention to Japan’s self-proclaimed spiritual and cultural 
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superiority over Korea. In his view, the rewriting of textbooks resulted from what he 
called ‘Japanese vanity’; Japan applied ‘civilised’ systems imported from Europe to 
itself, while detaching itself from ‘backwardness’ of the rest of Asia. He asserted that 
the Japanese had camouflaged the real aim of their rule over Korea by developing a 
type of Asian ‘white men’s burden’.114 
 
Finally, non-governmental reactions in Japan must be mentioned. As is obvious from 
the onset of the first dispute, leading Japanese newspapers were sympathetic 
towards Beijing and Seoul. For example, The Korea Times reported that the 
Japanese news media, generally displaying pacifist inclinations and critical attitudes 
towards conservative bureaucracy, extensively covered the rewriting of history in 
textbooks.115 
 
Among political circles, reactions were mixed. The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and 
the Japan Communist Party (JCP) were virtual mouthpieces of domestic protest 
movements against the government. Their persistent inquiries into the textbook 
disputes and related issues are extensively recorded in Diet committee proceedings. 
Individual Dietmen, including LDP members, also opposed the government. On the 
other hand, the Japanese side of the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians League 
appeared more interested in avoiding an escalation in diplomatic tension than in 
actually pressuring their government to take positive steps. 
 
Japanese citizens too raised their voice against the MOE and the government. 
Numerous Japanese individuals expressed their views in newspaper readers' 
columns; others sent a message directly to Chinese and South Korean journals and 
news media. For example, Irokawa Daikichi (professor at Tokyo Keizai University and 
historian) commented that whitewashing the militaristic past and romanticising it in 
films would influence young people and make them ‘more susceptible to rightist 
arguments’.116 Among civilian groups which demonstrated their concern over the 
textbook issue were Christian associations and six Sino-Japanese friendship 
organisations.117 For example, Utsunomiya Tokuma (Chairman of the Japan-China 
Friendship Association) accused the Japanese government of listening to right-wing 
opinion and of attempting to hinder Japan’s efforts at self-reproach over the invasion 
of China.118 Another voice from a Sino-Japanese organisation was Kunitomo 
Shuntaro (Chairman of the Liaison Council for Repatriates from China) who tried to 
address the causal connection between the war of aggression, crimes of killing and 
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the education provided to young Japanese at that time.119  Other opponents of the 
MOE and the government included academics, teachers’ organisations,120 publishers’ 
unions, the Society of Asian Women and Citizens’ Society on the Textbook Problem, 
the producer and the director of the film ‘The Game Yet to Finish’.121   
 
Furthermore, the Okinawans protested at the deletion of forced collective suicides 
during the Pacific War. A coalition of nine labour, teachers, women and youth 
organizations launched a protest campaign, urging the government to describe 
accurately the battle in Okinawa.122 Indigenous people in Hokkaido, the Ainu, 
opposed the deletion of explanations about their deprived rights to hunt, fish and use 
forests and forced cultural assimilation.123  These intrastate aspects of the textbook 
issue were also debated in Diet committees on many occasions.124  
 
However, Japanese citizens’ protest rallies were, on the whole, confined to specific 
groups. The very first Japanese public rally was held rather late during the first 
dispute (21 August 1982) and its scale was minimal. Organised by eight civilian 
groups, 300 to 400 citizens and students gathered near the MOE building in 
protest.125  Organised counter-rallies, i.e. in support of the Ministry of Education, were 
also virtually negligible, except for veterans’ gatherings. In fact, South Korean 
Education Minister Rhee Kyu-do, while acknowledging the criticisms raised against 
the government by Japanese intellectuals and citizens, commented that their actions 
alone could not influence the majority of their country men, and that it was necessary 
to exert external pressure to force a correction of inaccurate historical accounts.126  
 
In sum, it is undeniable that, in parallel with the diplomatic exchanges which took 
place between China and South Korea, and Japan, there were transnational forces 
representing the voice of ordinary people, although the extent and thrust of these 
forces greatly differed between the former aggressor and its victims. 
 
4. The Repercussions of the Textbook Issue in the Regional Context 
Although China and South Korea were the major players in the 1982 and 1986 
disputes, they were not unique in their interest in the textbook issue. It caused 
widespread repercussions in Asia and beyond, across political and ideological 
divides; reactions to the disputes varied from the vociferous to almost the negligible. 
This section will deal with these diverse ramifications of the textbook issue.  
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According to news sources used in this study, Taiwan, North Korea, Hongkong, the 
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), Vietnam, the Soviet Union and the 
United States all signalled varying degrees of vigilance to Tokyo in the wake of the 
first dispute. The uneven press coverage of the disputes and strict press control by 
some governments, in addition to the fact that this paper used only English and 
Japanese sources, make it difficult to assess the actual extent and intensity of 
reactions in these countries.127 Subject to this constraint, the paper will present an 
overview of the reactions of governments, the public and the news media in 
neighbouring countries. 
 
 A Comparison of Government, Public and News Media Reactions 
to the 1982 Dispute 
 
 Government The public The news media 
Taiwan +++++ +++ +++ 
North Korea +++ n.a. + 
Vietnam +++ n.a. + 
The Soviet Union +++ n.a. + 
Thailand ++ ++ ++ 
Malaysia + n.a. + 
Singapore + + ++++ 
Philippines + n.a. + 
Indonesia + + ++ 
Hongkong - +++++ +++++ 
The United States -  ++ +  
Britain - - +  
 
Note:   Strong reactions (+++++) ;  weak reactions (+); no or few reactions (-); information not 
available in the sources used in this paper (n.a.)  
 
Government reactions 
 
While the Japanese government appeared to be surrounded by a flood of public 
condemnation, only the Taipei government, apart from China and South Korea, 
launched a formal protest, calling for ‘proper’ actions by Tokyo on the textbooks in 
question.128  Although North Korea, the Soviet Union and Vietnam made provocative 
statements through their official press, they seem to have had no official contact with 
the Japanese government.129  With regard to the 1986 dispute, official reactions on 
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record are few, apart from those of Taiwan, North Korea and Vietnam.130 A summary 
of government reactions below includes some officials’ comments which were not 
necessarily made in their official capacity. 
 
The repercussions of the textbook issue crossed political and ideological divides; 
North and South Korea, China, Taiwan, the Soviet Union and Vietnam were all 
interested parties. Political rivalry among them did surface briefly though, as seen in 
Hanoi’s initial comment of ‘a Washington-Tokyo-Peking axis’131 and in an exchange of 
accusations between the official Soviet news agency Tass and the Chinese People’s 
Daily.132 However, Pyongyang paid attention to many concerned voices in Asia 
including the Korean, Chinese and Japanese peoples.133 Arch-rivals Pyongyang and 
Seoul came to take the same side in condemning Tokyo.134 Few acrimonious 
exchanges occurred between China and Taiwan on this issue. In fact, it was 
inconceivable that any party would support the Japanese government’s stand on this 
occasion. Rather, any political or ideological rivalry that emerged centred on the 
manner in which criticisms were made, all of which essentially carried the same 
message. 
 
Second, the ASEAN governments did not take particular action, with the exception of 
Thailand. Bangkok made an official inquiry into the Japanese textbooks in 1982, 
although its response came rather late, and it finally decided not to lodge any official 
protest against Tokyo. As for the other four members at that time, only a few officials’ 
comments are on record. For example, according to the Associated Press, the late 
President Ferdinand Marcos, who fought a guerrilla war against the Japanese 
Imperial Army, took exception to the United States.135 A leading newspaper, the 
Manila Times posited that the Philippines did not pay particular attention to the 1982 
dispute because of Marcos’ concern with possible friction with the Japanese 
government and financial circles.136  Another comment worthy of note was one made 
by the Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad. He denied that the textbook 
dispute would affect his ‘Look East’ policy, yet he could not help but mention the 
dispute involving the economic giant in the region. It is possible that both Manila and 
Kuala Lumpur refrained from making explicit official accusations against Japan 
because of economic considerations.  
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There also existed widespread uncertainty, if not articulated concern, over the 
military build-up in Japan.  The Straits Times (of Singapore) echoed the point as 
follows:   
A new generation of Japanese is growing up and inheriting a powerful economic 
machine with a formidable military capability.  The mistakes of their forebears must 
be learnt and understood, before the rest of Asia can feel at ease with a re-armed 
Japan.137  
 
Other Asian states’ uncertainty mainly centred around US-Japanese relations. They 
may have thought that the US-Japanese security treaty would stop Japan from 
arming, but Tokyo seemed to be going beyond this framework.138 This led Indonesian 
President Suharto to express concern about the US pressure on Japan to increase 
its military capability,139 while Prime Minister Mahathir mentioned nervousness over 
the limits of Japan’s ‘self-defence’.140 
 
Yet it must be noted that each country also tried to capitalise on this occasion to 
make opportunistic claims. Like Moscow and Pyongyang, Hanoi reproached the 
MOE’s textbook authorisation, but their main focus was on the US global strategy 
and the militarisation of Japan.141 The communist camp’s apprehension about this 
Western ally on the Pacific rim was not new in the Cold War situation. But Vietnam 
also accused China of endorsing US-Japanese relations, although this accusation 
was later dropped. The Kremlin, for its own national interests, made a point of 
including the Kurile Islands in discussions, though it failed to indicate how the 
territorial dispute related specifically to the textbook case.142  
 
Finally, possibly prompted by the 1982 dispute, at least two governments took a step 
(or a counter-measure) to revise their own history syllabuses. For instance, Taipei 
instructed its schools to teach students more about Japanese atrocities which took 
place in the war against China (5 August).143 Singapore’s Education Minister also 
announced a complete overhaul of the history syllabus for secondary schools in 
which the Japanese occupation was to be one of the main focuses (22 August).144 
 
Public reactions 
 
Like government reactions, the pattern of those of the public varied greatly from one 
country to another.  During the 1982 dispute, the activities of Hongkong citizens far 
exceeded those in other areas and countries, although some demonstrations were 
held in the US and Taiwan. 145 During the 1986 controversy, some protest activities 
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were observed in Thailand, Hongkong and the Philippines, but few were reported in 
the newspapers.146   
 
In Hongkong, students, teachers and university faculty staff played a central part in 
organising large-scale demonstrations and signing campaigns in the summer of 
1982. The Federation of Students and the Professional Teachers’ Union held a rally 
to commemorate the 51st anniversary of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria (19 
September).147 That day participants handed the Japanese consulate a petition with 
over 400,000 signatures, with the rally marking the climax of a two-month long 
campaign by students.148 Public protests even showed signs of violence when a 
home-made bomb exploded at a Japanese department store, and another was 
discovered. The Taiwanese people remained relatively quiet about the textbook 
revisions for some time in sharp contrast to the furious tone of newspapers there. But 
protest campaigns spread gradually from a group of college professors and students 
to citizens. 
 
On the other side of the Pacific, activities against the revisionist textbooks centred 
around a group called ‘Alliance Against Japanese Distortion of History’, which was 
founded by American citizens of Asian origin in September 1982. Although its 
activities out in the streets were on a much smaller scale than those organised by 
Hongkong students, the group examined various background factors of the textbook 
issue. It criticised Chinese and South Korean governments for settling the 1982 
dispute for economic reasons and the White House for placing pressure on Japan to 
rearm against possible Soviet expansion.149 The Alliance also lodged another Asian-
Americans’ protest at the time of Prime Minister Nakasone’s visit to the US in 
January 1983.150  
 
By contrast, public gatherings were almost non-existent in most of the ASEAN 
countries. The only organised campaign seems to have been that of the Chinese 
Journalists Welfare Association in Thailand, which sent a protest letter to the 
Japanese Embassy in Bangkok. This scarcity of civic reactions among the ASEAN 
members can be explained by a few factors. One would be that, because few 
passages in the Japanese textbooks were directly offensive to them, anti-Japanese 
sentiments were not aroused to the same extent as in China and South Korea. 
Another may be that the local press did not pick up this issue and the people had 
little knowledge of it.  In effect, after the peak of the first row, The Indonesia Times 
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pointed out that most Indonesians were unaware of the textbook issue except for 
what they read in the Western press; it also points to ‘a love-hate relationship’, based 
on the older generation’s admiration of Japan and their suffering under its 
occupation.151 A Singaporean parliamentarian also spoke of similar mixed attitudes 
towards the former aggressor. On the one hand, the older people would feel uneasy 
when Singaporean leaders often spoke of ‘learn from Japan’, on the other hand, they 
would remain silent because they accepted their economic relationship with Japan.152  
 
The news media’s reactions 
Government and public reactions provide only a partial picture of the repercussions 
the textbook issue caused in other countries. This may be complemented by the 
news media’s reportage. Below are some findings based on a geographical 
comparison of media reactions.  
 
First, a discernible gap existed between non-Asian and Asian newspapers in terms of 
the number of articles concerning the 1982 dispute, despite the almost simultaneous 
appearance of the first article in the week when the Chinese government made its 
official complaint. (During the 1986 dispute, there was no discernible quantitative gap 
between them since the total number was much smaller). During the peak three 
months from July to September 1982, The Times published 11 articles; Financial 
Times, 6; New York Times, 17; and The Washington Post, 13. On the other hand, the 
34 Asian newspapers under survey (except Chinese and South Korean newspapers) 
carried 36 articles on average during the same period.153 
 
Second, notwithstanding the previous point, a wide discrepancy was observed 
among Asian newspapers as well, ranging from those with more than 200 articles 
(Hongkong and Singapore) to those with no more than 20 during the same three 
months. Where either governmental or non-governmental actors protested at Japan, 
the average number of articles per paper reached 52. By country, Indonesian, 
Malaysian, Thai and Philippine newspapers in general carried fewer articles than 
Hongkong or Singaporean papers. 
 
A third point is that, while Asian newspapers dealt with the controversial accounts in 
the Japanese textbooks in detail, the Western news media tended to bring into focus 
major symbolic cases such as the ‘invasion/advance’ into China. For example, the 
Korean Central News Agency of North Korea gave concrete details regarding the 
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colonial enslavement policy and looting by Japanese imperialists, the infringement of 
Korea’s diplomatic and administrative rights (or the Koreans’ acceptance of a ‘treaty’ 
as described in Japanese teaching materials) and the confiscation of land (or 
‘confirmation of land ownership’).154 
 
It is also important to note that the tone of criticism in the press was not the same 
across the Asian region. For example, Thai and Indonesian accusations were, on the 
whole, somewhat reserved, compared with the expressions of outright indignation 
seen in the Hongkong and Singaporean press. An editorial in the Bangkok Post said 
that an ‘often admirable nation’, having been an economic miracle, ‘is coming under 
well-deserved attack for a campaign to make its citizens forget what came before all 
this hard-won success’.155 In the case of Bulletin Today (later Manila Bulletin), most 
articles were based on the Western press sources and they simply reported the 
developments of the official disputes involving China and South Korea.  
 
Not unexpectedly, a number of articles compared the ‘two postwar periods’ of West 
Germany and Japan in terms of education, foreign policies and their attitudes 
towards the past and regional countries. They pointed out different approaches to the 
issue of history the two countries adopted.156 
 
Finally, the local Asian media launched protest campaigns in various ways. 
Particularly, the Hongkong press played an active role in raising public awareness of 
the textbook issue, by broadcasting documentary films. Hong Kong Television 
Broadcast (TVB), with the largest audience there, had on air a 90 minute film 
including interviews with survivors of the Nanjing Massacre in mid-August in 1982. 
Documentary films such as ‘The Cruel War’ and ‘A Record of Blood’ (American and 
British films which featured the Nanjing Massacre and the Marco Polo Bridge 
incident) also drew public attention.157   
 
In conclusion, this paper has dealt with the impact of the textbook issue on Japan’s 
neighbours. Despite diverse repercussions—from formal government protests to 
private comments by officials, from large-scale mass demonstrations to subdued 
protests, and from local newspapers’ incessant coverage to occasional references, it 
was shown that the textbook issue, crossing political or ideological divides, tapped 
into the long-subsumed but unhealed indignation and grievances of many Asian 
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societies. Apart from latent political calculations on the part of governments, many 
people in the region raised their voice in a genuine manner. 
 
On the other hand, Japanese attitudes towards the textbook issue revealed that the 
country was trapped in its past. With ambiguity and hesitancy over Japan’s role 
before and during the Second World War on the part of the government, Japanese 
society has drifted in much of the postwar period, with diverse views and 
interpretations of what actually happened. Certainly, the Japanese people could not 
help touching upon earlier generations’ experiences of the war. But, Japanese 
society as a whole did not embark on a serious introspection of its recent past until 
the 1990s. 
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List of Abbreviations 
 
AAB Asian Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 
AFP Agence France-Presse 
AP The Associated Press 
AS Asahi Shimbun (Japan) 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
AUD Audit Committee* 
BP Bangkok Post 
CD China Daily 
D the Diet (the Japanese parliament) 
DSP Democratic Socialist Party (Japan) 
E the evening edition of Japanese newspapers 
ED Education Committee* 
FA  Foreign Affairs Committee* 
FT Financial Times 
HC the House of Councillors (the Upper House) (Japan) 
HR the House of Representatives (the Lower House) (Japan) 
IT The Indonesia Times 
JCP Japan Communist Party 
JSP Japan Socialist Party 
KBS Korean Broadcasting System (South Korea) 
KH The Korea Herald (South Korea)   
KNHCC Korean National History Compilation Committee (South Korea) 
KNI Kantorberita Nasional Indonesia 
KT The Korea Times (South Korea) 
LDP Liberal Democratic Party (Japan) 
M the morning edition of Japanese newspapers 
MD Malaysian Digest 
MOE Ministry of Education (Japan) 
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan) 
NYT New York Times 
RTN Reuters News 
SEC Security Committee* 
ST The Straits Times (Singapore) 
SWB BBC Summary of World Broadcast 
TARC Textbook Authorisation Research Council (Japan) 
TIM The Times 
TWP  The Washington Post 
UPI United Press International 
XHNA Xinhua News Agency (China) 
 
*A committee of the Japanese Diet (parliament) 
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Endnotes 
 
Below, the details of Diet committees are presented as follows:  ‘D-96-HR, FA, ...’.   
This means the 96th Diet Session, the House of Representatives, the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, followed by the date and the page(s). 
 
1 For example, refer to Chinese Premier Zhu Ronji’s visit to Japan (in mid-
October 2000) and Pyongyang-Tokyo talks on the establishment of diplomatic 
relations (in late October 2000). 
 
2 In this paper, Asia is defined as a region covering North and South Korea, 
China, Hongkong, Macao, Taiwan, ASEAN member countries in the 1980s 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei (since 
January 1984)), Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Burma. The Indian sub-
continent and Oceanic countries are excluded. 
 
3  The textbook issue (‘Kyokasho Mondai’ in Japanese) is often used in a 
broader sense, to mean the repercussions which the disputes caused and the 
whole subject concerning controversial accounts of historical events in 
textbooks, than just as a reference to the diplomatic disputes of 1982 and 
1986. 
 
4 As to the actual planning and preparation of curriculum, see, for example, 
Tokyo Metropolitan Government (Liaison and Protocol Section, Bureau of 
General Affairs) (ed.), Education in Tokyo, Tokyo, 1979, pp.107-09. 
 
5 NYT, 27.8.82 
 
6 AS,26.6.82, p.1. With regard to the controversial ‘misinformation’, it seems that 
the Japanese media’s original coverage of the textbook screening in 1982 did 
not accurately reflect the ways in which it proceeded that year. Some 
accounts, but not all of them, were rewritten in the process of textbook 
screening. Yet, after the Ministry’s explanation about this process, the 
Japanese government virtually dismissed the issue of ‘misinformation’. The 
reason seems to be that both Beijing and Seoul began to question Tokyo’s 
foreign policy stance and that overseas anti-Japanese sentiments were 
growing in many Asian countries.  Furthermore, this paper adds the following 
points: 1) the South Korean press already pointed out inaccurate accounts in 
Japanese textbooks in 1981, and this was debated at the Education 
Committee in October of that year; 2) the Korean National History Compilation 
Committee itself examined Japanese textbooks in 1982  (see Note 18 below); 
and 3) regardless of the process of textbook screening, its results were not 
agreeable to either China or South Korea.   See D-95-HC, ED, 27.10.81, pp.3-
6; D-96-HC, ED, 29.7.82, pp.4, 7 and 12; D-96-HR, ED, 30.7.82, pp.3-6; D-96-
HR, ED, 4.8.82, p.2; D-96-HR, FA, 9.8.82, p.2; D-96-HC, SEC, 10.8.82, p.12; 
D-96-HR, AUD, 10.8.82, pp.4-5; D-96-HC, FA, 19.8.82, p.23; and D-96-HR, 
AUD, 21.9.82, pp.13-4 and 20. 
 
7 XHNA, 28.6.82, p.18 
 
8 Asian Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (ed.), Chugoku 
Geppo (China Monthly), July 1982, p.9 
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9 In 1982, the official Xinhua News Agency filed 212 reports on the textbook 
issue from 28 June to 30 September when the issue was most intensely 
debated.  The China Daily carried 118 articles from 1 July to 30 September; 
The Korea Herald, 278 (including letters to the editor) from 20 July to 29 
September; and The Korea Times, 232 (including letters to the editor) from 18 
July to 29 September. 
 
10 Despite the claim that textbooks are an ‘internal affair’ by some Japanese 
politicians, International Society for Educational Information or ISEI 
(established in 1958 and affiliated to the Japanese Foreign Ministry) gathers 
foreign textbooks and examines accounts of Japan in these textbooks. The 
main aim of this activity is to provide foreign countries with accurate 
information about the country.   
 
11 For these controversial comments made at a Cabinet meeting (27 July), see 
AS, E.27.7.82, p.2.  
 
12 Caroline Rose, ‘The Textbook Issue: Domestic Sources of Japan’s Foreign 
Policy’, Japan Forum, vol.11, no.2, 1999, pp.211-12 
 
13 XHNA. 28.7.82, pp.4-5 and KT, 28.7.82, p.1. The Sino-Japanese Joint 
Statement said: ‘The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility of 
the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people 
through war, and deeply reproaches itself’. Public Information and Cultural 
Affairs Bureau, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (ed.), Nitchu Kankei 
Shiryoshu (A Collection of Documents on Sino-Japanese Relations), Tokyo, 
1982, p.195.  
 
14 This meeting was held between Xiao Xiangqian (Director of the First 
Department of Asian Affairs of the Chinese Foreign Ministry) and Watanabe 
Koji (a minister at the Japanese Embassy in Beijing) on 28 July. AS, 
M.29.7.82, p.1 
 
15 KT, 27.7.82, p.1. 
 
16 XHNA, 28.7.82, pp.4-5 
 
17 In fact, South Korean Education Ministry officials commented, before their 
investigation of the Japanese textbooks, that Seoul would not make demands 
on Tokyo for corrections even if they found the textbooks problematic. KH, 
23.7.82, p.8 
 
18 KH, 23.7.82, p.8. The South Korean Education Ministry said after the 
examination that it would be desirable that academics or private organisations 
make arrangements for corrections. On 5 August 1982, the Korean National 
History Compilation Committee (KNHCC) said that 16 Japanese textbooks to 
be used from April 1983 contained distortions or wrong accounts of 24 
historical facts relating to Korea, 15 of which concern modern history. KH, 
6.8.82, p.3 
 
19 KT, 1.8.82, p.1 
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20 KT, 29.7.82, p.1 
 
21 Lee Sang-jin (a Korean minister to Tokyo) and Suzuki Isao (Director of 
Elementary and Secondary Education Bureau of the MOE) were at this 
meeting.  AS, M.31.7.82, p.3 The Korea Herald criticised in an editorial that 
the Japanese government treated China and South Korea differently in 
dealing with the textbook dispute, pointing out that ‘[k]owtowing to the big and 
bullying before the small are part and parcel of Japanese duplicity derived 
from its inferiority complex’. KH, 31.7.82, p.2 
 
22 KH, 4.8.82, p.1 
 
23 Kenneth B. Pyle, ‘Japan Besieged: The Textbook Controversy’, Journal of 
Japanese Studies, vol.9, no.2, 1983, pp.297-300 
 
24 AS, M.5.8.82, p.1 
 
25 A meeting was held between Vice-Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian and 
Japanese Ambassador to China Katori Yasue. XHNA, 5.8.82, pp.4-5 
 
26 KH, 7.8.82, p.1 and KT, 7.8.82, p.1 
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Japan and India : Religion-based Parties 
Coming into Government in the 1990s 
 
Kenji Tozawa 
 
Introduction 
At a glance India, which is a sub-continent and multilingual, multi-religious, 
multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and has around 600 million voters and Japan, which is 
homogeneous, uni-lingual, less religion conscious, and consists of 4 main islands and 
has only 70 million voters hardly share the same political agenda.  
 
But, if we examine with some criteria, there are reasons to compare India with Japan. 
First, it must be pointed out that most Japanese people think of India as the origin of 
the eastern spiritual world. Japanese are now economy-oriented people, so they don’t 
look as though they depend on Buddhism, but undoubtedly their way of thinking is 
influenced by Buddhist thought. Secondly, the two countries were politically remote in 
the age of the cold war. But when the cold war ended in the 1990s, the Japanese 
business community turned their eyes to the Indian market due to Indian economic 
liberalisation. Still the two countries are not so deeply linked in regard to human 
resources, trade in commodities and money flow.  
 
Under such circumstances I want to set up two criteria to consider. It has to be noted 
that the two countries had a long history of the so-called ‘one dominant party system’ 
and both countries were recently faced with a drastic change from that regime. Where 
is the party system going after the ‘one dominant party system’? Will a ‘two party 
system’ be introduced, or some other system? It seems that the answer has become  
rather clear. Coalition governments appeared as alternative systems in both India and 
in Japan in the 1990s. Why and how did it take place in each country? The first 
criterion of the party system or the power structure can be one of the interesting 
themes by which to compare both countries. 
 
Apart from the formation of coalition governments in the 1990s there appeared a 
conspicuous phenomenon in the political arena. In both countries after the demise of 
the ‘one dominant party system’ the religion-based political parties joined the coalition 
governments taking advantage of the situation. In India the religion-based Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) expanded in a short time at the end of 1980s, and gained power at 
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the end of the decade as a leading party in a coalition government. Meanwhile 
another religion-based party, Komeito, sneaked into power, joining the coalition 
government with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) at the end of 1990s, though at 
that time it was not really growing. India and Japan have never had coalition 
governments with religion-based political parties, because after World War II they 
declared themselves to be secular countries and were very reluctant to admit religious 
groups’ participation in political activities. Where are these religion-based parties 
going? What are the roles of religion-based parties, or the roles of religion in politics? 
This is the second criterion by which to examine politics in India and Japan. 
 
As a matter of fact how the collapse of the ‘one dominant party system’ and the 
participation of religion-based parties in governments took place is quite different in 
each country. I shall show the differences of the historical process and analyse the 
political situation comparing the two countries.  
 
1 Religion –based Political Movements 
1-1 Historical Background of Komeito 
Komeito was founded in 1964 following 8 years preparatory period as a separate part 
of the Sokagakkai (SG), which was a religious lay organization of Nichiren Shoshu 
Buddhism. At the beginning the SG proclaimed that the aim of Komeito was to 
achieve a society where policies were based on Buddhist philosophy. The SG called 
this idea Obutsu Myogo [fusion of Buddhism and politics]. The SG produced various 
ideas or at least technical words such as Buddhist Democracy, Humanity Socialism 
and Global Nationalism. This organisation sent 3 politicians to the Upper House 
[Sangiin] in 1956, 6 in 1959 and 9 in 1962. Establishing the party officially, 25 MPs 
were sent to the Lower House [Shugiin] for the first time in 1967. Thus Komeito could 
expect a quick expansion of the number of politicians in the Diet and the local 
assemblies and councils. 
 
Unfortunately their desires and wishes were not materialised. Before materialising or 
sophisticating the ideas they produced, they were faced with many serious problems. 
In a way their campaign methods were pretty harsh; ordinary campaigners did not 
observe the legal regulations. That was partly because they were totally amateur in 
politics. Some leaders were arrested for violation of the Public Offices Election Law in 
1957. Apart from this kind of incident the case of the violation of freedom of speech 
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and the press gave a special shock to the Japanese public. 
 
In December 1969 Hirosato Fujiwara was about to publish a book, which was full of 
blunt criticisms against the SG and Komeito. The SG leaders tried to stop him 
publishing this book. They asked a powerful politician, Kakuei Tanaka, to influence 
Fujiwara. In spite of the interference Fujiwara did publish the book and sued the SG in 
court for violation of freedom of the press. It brought a great social problem in Japan. 
All the mass media severely condemned the SG for violation of human rights. The 
Communist Party of Japan raised the issue of the oneness of Komeito and the SG as 
an example of the wrong relationship between politics and religion, and tried to 
summon the president of the SG Daisaku Ikeda to the Lower House. Actually the SG 
had suppressed a book written by Daizo Kumabe in the previous year. It seemed all 
parts of society accused it of this violation. As a result the SG was forced to change 
the basic principle. Till then the SG leaders firmly believed the SG was Komeito, 
Komeito was the SG, both were inseparable. But now they had to accept the idea of 
the separation of church and state. Ikeda officially apologised at the general meeting 
in 1970 that the prevention of the publication was regretted, and since many people 
criticized that the SG was aiming for the National Ordination Platform Kokuritsukaidan, 
namely the establishment of a national religion, he said the SG would not use this 
term. Further he declared that the leaders would clearly separate Komeito from the 
SG, and never seek out Obutsu Myogo .(The Seikyo Shinbun [the SG’s news paper], 
4 May 1970.) 
 
It seems that to the SG there were three choices at that time. First, it could insist that it 
would never discard the idea of Obutsu Myogo. That meant the SG would aim at 
establishing a Buddhist society in Japan by converting at least a third of Japanese 
people to Nichiren Buddhism and by using political influence. But it was almost 
impossible for the SG to convert even a third of Japanese people. Secondly, the SG 
could express its wish to have a share of political power. As a matter of fact it did so. It 
explained in their new programme, which was published following the speech of the 
president in 1970. Komeito declared that it would become a national party. It meant 
that it would be an ordinary political party, which tried to gain power or to resort to 
manoeuvres or to join a coalition government. The third choice would be to stay in a 
position as a sort of political night watchman. In this case Komeito could be reduced to 
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be a party of the Upper House only, or it could keep members in the Lower House but 
not intend to be a part of any government. If the SG had adopted the third choice, the 
SG members could have avoided tough campaigns to support Komeito, and Komeito 
could have kept the raison d’être of securing religious causes. But the third choice 
was clearly thrown away and the SG took a step forward again for political power after 
1970. In terms of the relationship between politics and religion as in Komeito, the year 
of 1970 was the real turning-point in its history.  
 
There was a serious problem in Komeito. It was the matter of raison d’être. The SG 
was a religious body and had produced Komeito in order to achieve its religious goals 
through the political party system. But now Komeito proclaimed that it wanted to be a 
national party not bound by one religious body but supported by a broad constituency. 
Then to the SG was Komeito really necessary? Did the SG members have to cast 
votes all the time for Komeito candidates only? In fact as Table 1 shows, Komeito 
increased the seats it held in both houses even after 1970. 
 
Table 1 
Seats of Komeito in the Lower House 
           1967  69  72  76  79  80  83  86  90  93    96   2000 
Komeito    25    47  29  56  58  34  59  57  46  52  (156)   31 
(In 1996 Komeito was merged into New Frontier Party.) 
 
Seats and Votes of Komeito in the Upper House 
         1956  59  62  65  68  71  74  77  80  83  86  89  92  95  98 
Komeito’s    3   9  15  20  24  23  24  24  27  26  25  20  24  11   22 
Seats &     3   6   9   11  13  10  14  14  17  16  15  10  14       11               
Votes(mi)  1.0  2.5  4.1  5.1  6.7  5.6  6.4  7.2  6.7  7.3  7.4  6.1  6.4      7.7 
[source: Asahi Shinbun] 
 
It seems very important to me that only because the SG kept religious purposes and 
goals in its political campaigns, its members followed the directions to vote for 
Komeito believing them to be religious guidance or mandate. 
 
Komeito changed policies easily and frequently. For instance at one time they insisted 
on dissolving the Japan-United States Security Treaty step-by-step, and then they 
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changed the policy to dissolve it as soon as possible, and then they finally admitted it 
as a necessary defense policy. At each stage the members of the SG supported 
Komeito’s policy. It sounds as though they would keep supporting Komeito no matter 
what happens. They must have given their support as part of religious practise. 
 
As long as the SG keeps its religious goals in politics secretly, the members can follow 
the directions to support Komeito easily. But in the 1990s another crisis hit the SG and 
Komeito. I shall explain that in the next section. 
 
1-2 The Expansion of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
The Indian government banned the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which had 
been formed in 1925 by K.B. Hedgewar. On 30 January 1948 a fanatical Hindu who 
was a former member of the RSS assassinated Mahatma Gandhi, but the attitude of 
the government was not severe and decisive, and it lifted the ban on the RSS within a 
year believing there was no involvement of Guru Golwalkar. Though almost all 
religion-based political parties lost importance in free India, the RSS could start 
activities again after the lifting of the ban in July 1949. That was the historical 
background of the formation of a new political party, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), 
out of the RSS in October 1951. 
 
As a Hindu nationalist party the BJS proclaimed the Hindu cultural revivalism without 
hesitation. In a sense the BJS showed the original stance of the BJP. It was to aim at 
building India as a Hindu Nation based on ‘two-nations theory’ (see M. Desai, 
‘Communalism, secularism and the dilemma of Indian nationhood,’ pp. 91-125.) and 
to clear up the Kashmir problem by integrating Kashmir with India and treating it the 
same as other states. As for economic policy the BJS advocated Swadeshi [native 
first] earnestly calling for subsidies to deserving industries and providing tariff 
protection against unfair competition. In spite of the passionate efforts of the BJS 
workers, the party did not grow rapidly as Table 2 shows. 
 
Table 2 
Seats of the BJS (till 1971) and the BJP (after 1984) in Lok Sabha 
        1952  57  62  67  71   77    80   84  89   91   96   98    99 
BJS/BJP   3    4   14  35  22  (295)  (31)  2   86  120  161  179   180 
                                                              (250)  (298) 
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(In 1977 and 1980 the BJS was merged into the Janata Party. In 1998 and 1999 the 
figures in parentheses were the seats of the BJP and allied parties.)  
[sources: Figures are derived from Graham, Puri, Ahuja & Paul, Frontline, The Hindu.] 
 
That was partly because the reputation of the BJS was that of fanatical Hindu 
Fundamentalism or the cause of troubles Hindu Communalism. So the political turmoil 
in 1975 was rather convenient to the BJS to get the opportunity to cooperate with 
other parties. In June 1975 the BJS and other parties formed a janata front [people’s 
front] to fight the Assembly of Gujarat State. A little later Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
proclaimed a national State of Emergency and suspended the right of Habeas Corpus 
in June to fight all institutions hostile to the Congress Government. When she made 
clear in January 1977 that a general election would be held in March two months later, 
four parties including the BJS immediately unified into the Janata Party. The Janata 
Party achieved a great victory at the 1977 General Election, but it dramatically lost 
power after three years at the next poll. Apart from the success of Indira Gandhi’s 
populist movement to regain power, the ruling party had a great problem within the 
coalition. It was related to the background of the BJS, namely the issue of dual 
membership. The former BJS members were also members of the RSS, and some 
group within the Morarji Desai Government raised this issue objecting to the dual 
membership of the former BJS members. The disunity became clear and the conflict 
got sharp. At the 1980 General Election the Janata Party contested 431 and secured 
only 31 seats, while it had secured 295 seats contesting 405 in 1977. Under such 
circumstances the BJP was founded in 1980 supported by the RSS; and Atal Behari 
Vajpayee was selected as the first president. 
 
The BJP started its history with at least two difficult problems the same as the BJS. 
The BJS already recognized one problem, which was the image of communalism and 
the character of exclusiveness. So they introduced a new principle called ‘Integral 
Humanism’ in 1965 for the purpose of ‘downplaying the communal image of the Jana 
Sangh in favour of a softer spiritual, non-aggressive image stressing equality, 
“Indianization” and social harmony.’ (Hansen & Jaffrelot, p.293.) But when Vajpayee 
delivered his presidential speech at Bandra in 1980, he expounded Gandhian 
socialism rejecting both western capitalism and Soviet planning, though later changed 
the tone of the policy to adjust to the integral humanism principle. There were two 
different guidelines inside the BJP from the beginning. 
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But the RSS and another religious group, the VHP (Vishwa Hindu Parishad) did want 
to keep the communal strength, so they replaced Vajpayee with a hard-liner Lal 
Krishna Advani in May 1984. As a result, however, they secured only two seats at the 
1984 General Election. Since the elections were held immediately after the 
assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, it was understandable that the voters 
as a whole had strong sympathy with the late Mrs. Gandhi. If the BJP wanted to be 
seen as an alternative, it was obvious that it had to add something to their principles. 
But even after this defeat they did not change their principles. They instead 
enthusiastically expounded ‘Hindutva [Hindu first]’ in the latter half of the 1980s 
knowing they had a difficult problem on principle. Partly their guideline was 
appropriate at that time, because the slogan ‘Hindutva’ could invite the votes from 
wide range cutting across caste lines. But naturally the Muslim votes and the votes of 
Dalits did not come to Hindutva, for they were not supposed to get the benefits from 
‘Hindutva’. 
 
The other difficulty was related to economic policy. The BJP succeeded to the BJS 
Programme insisting on Swadeshi, and in the context of Integral Humanism it 
stressed the policy of decentralisation of power. Actually some sort of Swadeshi was 
the official economic policy of India, led by the Congress Governments till the middle 
of the 1980s. But Rajiv Gandhi started the liberalization of Indian economy, and 
Narasimha Rao substantially deregulated and liberated the Indian economy in 1991. If 
the BJP wanted to take over the strong central government, it had to cope with the 
new economic policy and the policy of decentralisation. This question will become 
serious when the BJP is about to hold political power.  
 
2 From One Dominant Party System to Coalition Government 
2-1 Political Change in Japan after 1993 
In India and Japan really drastic political changes took place coincidently in the 1990s. 
The two criteria can be applied to explain the features of those changes. To reiterate, 
they are ‘the change of party system’ and ‘the religion-based parties’ participation in 
governments’. The coming of religion-based parties into power in both countries can 
be understood in the context of the change of party system. 
 
In Japan the LDP enjoyed the ‘one dominant party system’ for nearly 40 years from its 
foundation in 1955. The opposition parties had almost no chance to get a majority 
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even if they could unite. This party system was named the ‘55 Regime’, expected by 
many to last forever. It was unhealthy because it offered no prospect of a change of 
government, but it could be said to be healthy in the sense that inside the LDP 
factions there were alternative forms of government. Here a faction meant a party 
within a party. Very few people anticipated the fall of the LDP.  
 
But in 1988 the Recruit Incident was exposed by the Asahi Shinbun. As a case of 
corruption it did not surprise people, since corruption was one of the features of 
Japanese politics. But the Recruit Incident had characteristics different from other 
corruptions. The Recruit leaders scattered the unopened stocks to many politicians. In 
fact it contaminated a large number of figures, not only big politicians but also efficient 
bureaucrats and even the opposition politicians. This incident and the scandals in 
politics and economy that followed made Japanese people feel something had to be 
done. Under the Kaifu government (1989-91) the pressure of ‘Political Reform’ was so 
strong that Prime Minister Kaifu resigned as a candidate for the LDP President seeing 
the bills of political reform dropped at the Diet by the objections from his own party. 
The LDP politicians were not against the concept of political reform, but they did not 
agree to each bill. 
 
But when a small group led by Ichiro Ozawa divided the LDP in 1992 under the 
Miyazawa government and consequently Miyazawa dissolved the Lower House in 
June 1993, a great political change was inevitable. On 4 July a General Election was 
held and the LDP lost heavily, though it secured 223 (majority 256 more) and kept the 
position of the biggest party. After 1955 the LDP sat as an opposition party for the first 
time, and a new government led by Morihiro Hosokawa, Chairman of the fourth 
biggest group in the ruling party, was formed by the coalition of 8 parties. This was the 
beginning of the great political change. Many people especially political scientists 
expected the change of the party system from the ‘one dominant party system’ to a 
‘two party system’, or at least that there should now be a change of administration 
between the LDP and coalition governments. 
 
What has happened in Japanese politics since 1993 is (as Table 3 shows) not what 
scholars expected. I should say it was totally messy as a political reform. But to 
examine the contents of the reform is not the intention of this paper. It should be noted 
that as a result of the reform the confrontation between the coalition group and the 
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LDP ultimately did not emerge.  
 
Table 3 
Formation of Governments in Japan after 1993 
6 August 1993  Hosokawa Government 
• Coalition government (8 parties): Nihon Shinto (35), JSP (70), Shinseito (55), 
Komeito (51), Minshato (15). Shinto Sakigake (13), Shaminren (4). 
Independents (30)          273   
• Opposition: LDP (223), CPJ (15)        238 
29 June 1994  Murayama Government 
• Coalition government :LDP(230), SDPJ (70), Sakigake (13)     313 
• Opposition: Shinseito (55), Komeito (51), Minshato (15), Nihon Shinto (40), 
Independents (22), CPJ  (15)               198  
(Shaminren merged into Nihon Shinto) 
7 November 1996  Hashimoto Government 
• Coalition government: LDP ( 239), SDPJ (15), Sakigake (2)     256 
• Opposition: New Frontier (156), Democratic (52), CPJ (26), Others (10)   244 
5 October 1999  Obuchi Government 
• Coalition government: LDP (239), Liberal (42), Komeito (37)     318 
• Opposition: Democratic (52), SDPJ (15), CPJ (26), Others (89)     182 
25 June,  2000  Mori Government 
• Coalition government: LDP (233), Komeito (31), Conservative (7),   271 
• Opposition: Democratic (127), Liberal (22), SDPJ (19), CPJ (20),  
Others(21)           209 
 
(Key: LDP: Liberal Democratic Party, JSP: Japanese Social Party, CPJ: Communist 
Party of Japan, SDPJ: Social Democratic Party of Japan out of JSP) [source: Asahi 
Shinbun] 
 
What really has happened is that the LDP did not lose power except during the short 
period of two governments. Actually the LDP was the opposition party for 11 months 
between August 1993 and June 1994. Then did no significant changes take place? Of 
course there were important changes. The political reform, which was realised by the 
Hosokawa government in January 1994, did give a big change to the electoral system. 
But the most important change was, it seems to me, the way in which the LDP was 
restored to political power. In Table 3 if you look at the Murayama Government, the 
coalition government was supported by 223 members of the LDP, 70 members of the 
SDPJ and 13 members of Sakigake. Prime Minister Murayama was Chairman of the 
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SDPJ, which held only 70 seats. Besides the SDPJ had been a main opponent to the 
LDP for a long time. There was little chance of Murayama becoming Prime Minister in 
the normal political process. But in order to recapture power the LDP adopted an ‘ultra 
C’ strategy which meant forming a coalition with a party of absolutely opposite political 
thought. Furthermore the LDP decided to name Murayama as Prime Minister, as part 
of flirting with the SDPJ. The methods of the LDP were a symptom of a new era of 
Japanese politics. It may be said that blatant Machiavellianism will be acceptable in 
the new era of politics. 
 
One of the conspicuous phenomena of this new trend was the change of the JSP. 
Until this time they had clearly been against the Japan-United States Security Treaty, 
and had insisted that the Self Defense Forces were unconstitutional. But they now 
abruptly and awkwardly accepted both the treaty and the Self Defense Forces as 
constitutional. In a sense they sacrificed the traditional principles of their party in 
return for joining the government. No wonder they got just 15 seats at the next poll in 
1996. This is what has become of the one time leading opposition party. 
 
How did Komeito survive this political turbulence? As I wrote earlier, Komeito was hit 
by serious crises. First they had to decide to which side they belonged.  Because 
Komeito was trying to be against the LDP at least as a gesture, it was not so difficult 
for it to decide which way they should go when the LDP government collapsed in 1993. 
They accordingly decided to join the coalition government. But, when the Hata 
Government was formed as the second coalition government in April 1994, some 
groups within the coalition government tried to downgrade the JSP and as a result the 
JSP and Sakigake left the coalition. Komeito stayed in the coalition at that time.  
 
The true crisis came to Komeito when Ozawa and other leaders tried to establish a big 
‘mosaic party’ called the New Frontier Party [Shinshinto]. This proposal was 
irresistible for it inspired the two party system. But there was still an inherent problem 
for Komeito. Originally the purpose of Komeito was quite different from any other 
political party. When it was accused of the violation of human rights in 1970, it decided 
to be a national party, and if possible to cooperate with other parties. But in reality it 
kept the religious causes secretly until the 1990s. Now it was faced with the 
dissolution of the party.  
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Komeito did something odd at this time. They divided their small party into two and let 
members of the Lower House belong to the new party, and let some members at the 
Upper House belong to Komei (a slightly different name) out of the new party. As 
Table 1 shows at the election of the Upper House in 1995, 11 members remained as 
members of Komei. It may be said that basically Komeito merged into the New 
Frontier Party, which might have the possibility of alternating in power with the LDP.  
But, in spite of a great deal of effort, the New Frontier Party turned out to be dissolved 
in 1997. Komeito was re-established immediately without any confusion. In fact it was 
the actual proof that Komeito could exist or be extinguished at the SG’s will. Komeito 
adopted the astonishing policy after reorganizing the party. To the great surprise of the 
Japanese people Komeito changed direction and formed a coalition government with 
the Liberal Party led by Ozawa and the LDP itself in October 1999. In the case of the 
JSP, after hot discussions they conceded to the requests from the LDP to sustain the 
government and changed their fundamental policies abruptly. But in Komeito’s case 
when it formed the coalition government with its longstanding opponent the LDP, it 
seemed no heated discussion occurred in the party. It looked as if the question of the 
differences of basic policies no longer matters. In June 2000 after the General 
Election, Komeito again joined the LDP-led coalition government with the 
Conservative Party. So coalition governments appeared many times after 1993, but 
many of them were not against the LDP but were LDP-led coalition governments. In 
this drifting political situation, Komeito once formed a coalition government with 
anti-LDP parties, then divided the party into two, and then reunited to form coalition 
governments with the LDP. 
 
This is what has happened in the Japanese political arena since 1993. It was the 
beginning of a new era, but not the era of a two party system or coalition governments, 
but the era of anything-can-happen.  
 
2-2 The Congress in Decline in India 
The rule of the Indian National Congress Party, in other words the ‘one dominant party 
system’ in India, was ending at the 1989 General Election. The Congress Party led by 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi lost heavily at the poll as Table 4 shows.                           
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Table 4 
Seats of Congress in Lok Sabha 
         1952   57   62   67   71   77   80    84   89   91   96   98    99  
Congress  364  371  361  283  342  154  353  415  197  232  140  145    113  
(169)  (135) 
(In 1998 and 99 the figures in parentheses are the numbers for the Congress and its 
Allies.) [sources: Figures are derived from Joshi & Hebsur, Kumar, Frontline, The 
Hindu.] 
 
In December 1989 a coalition government was formed for the second time in modern 
Indian history. The structure of the government was that the National Front which 
consisted of the Janata Dal and the left parties formed the cabinet and the BJP 
supported it from outside, keeping the Congress Party as the Opposition Party. 
Whether the Janata Dal learned any lessons from history or not, it lasted for less than 
a year. India got involved with the great social and political turmoil related to the caste 
system. Prime Minister V. P. Singh of the coalition government made clear the policy 
of implementing the Mandal Commission’s Report which caused an agitation by 
students who set fire to themselves in resisting the government.   
 
The BJP was in a dilemma. If they agreed to the Mandal Report, they would lose the 
votes from the forward caste’s people, and if they opposed it, they would lose support 
from a vast number of backward Hindu people. In this situation ‘The Ayodhya 
campaign was the only remedy and the temple was the only issue which could match 
the multi-dimensional challenge of Mandalism.’ (Ahuja and Paul, p.72.)  
 
The BJP withdrew support from the government and eventually V.P. Singh resigned. 
Here the Congress manoeuvred Chandra Shekhar into leaving the Janata Dal and 
forming an extreme minority government by giving its tentative support. The Chandra 
Shekhar Government continued for 4 months under the virtual control of Rajiv Gandhi 
between November 1990 and March 1991. Chandra Shekhar conceded to the 
demands of Congress one after another but, when the Congress kept condemning the 
government, he was determined to resign and recommended the president to call a 
General Election. 
 
The role and tactics of the Congress were exactly the same as those of the LDP 
towards the Murayama SDPJ Government. As a big party the LDP and the Congress 
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tried to control the government from behind the scenes. While Murayama’s SDJP was 
reduced to a mere bubble party in return for joining the coalition government, Chandra 
Shekhar, the leader of a tiny party, proposed holding an election because he did not 
want to be exploited in government.  
 
The BJP expounded Hindutva loudly and repeatedly during the 1991 General Election 
campaign. But for the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the result 120 to the BJP, 232 to 
the Congress might have been different. In this result the leader of the Congress, 
Narasimha Rao, was inaugurated as Prime Minister, and his government survived for 
5 years in spite of a stream of troubles. In a sense Rao’s government can be seen as 
the moratorium government. The decline of the Congress was hard to stop, and 
people were looking for an alternative. The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi reminded 
the voters again of the great sympathy felt towards the Gandhi family and the result 
did not show a sharp decline for the Congress. But the BJP was growing to be an 
alternative. The decline of the Congress was to become apparent from the 1996 
General Election onward. 
 
While the Congress was losing credibility because of the corruption, the criminal 
conspiracy and the resisting riots, the BJP was preparing for the next government. But 
it was faced with two problems. One was how to keep its religious purpose and the 
other was how to adapt Swadeshi to the new economic policy. 
 
The BJP resorted to the slogan of Hindutva in the 1989 and 1991 General Election 
campaigns. When the Ayodhya incident with 1200 deaths in Hindu-Muslim Riots 
broke out, the BJP government of Uttar Pradesh could do nothing, which invoked 
presidential administration. In the elections of local assemblies in 1993 the BJP 
showed signs of a retreat losing the votes of Muslim and Dalits and other people 
worried about Hindu Fundamentalism. The BJP had to realize that, as long as they 
could ignore the vote-bank of Muslims and STs and SCs, they could inspire the high 
spirit of Hindutva. But if they needed the votes of all the corners of society, a new 
trend must come. Thus the BJP changed the tone in the Manifesto of 1996 from that 
of 1991. After the 1996 General Election it is evident that the BJP started to attract 
those who did not support them before. 
 
The other problem was how to adjust Swadeshi to economic liberalisation. Actually 
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the conflict could be found within their own camp. The RSS embarked on a campaign 
for Swadeshi immediately after the Rao government took up economic liberalisation. It 
claimed that the commercialism and consumerism induced by the multinational 
companies undermined Hindu culture and spoiled the base of the Indian economy, 
which was accepted by the older generation with applause. But as the BJP developed, 
there came so-called newcomers belonging to the middle class and usually involved 
with business who did not show a keen interest in Swadeshi. They were primarily 
concerned with the necessity of economic liberalisation. Besides inside the BJP there 
were politicians of insight like L.K. Advani who understood the necessity both to 
protect the Indian economy and to adjust the Indian native economy to the global 
economy. 
 
After the inner struggle the BJP adopted the ‘RSS-corrective’ in 1991. On the one 
hand they modified their pro-liberalisation policy to take account of Swadeshi 
adjusting to the RSS-corrective; on the other hand they re-interpreted the claims of 
the RSS insisting on the need for a new Indian model of a self-confident, hard-working 
modern nation that can deal with the world in terms of equality in the spirit of 
Swadeshi. The two streams in economics, Swadeshi [protectionism] and free 
economy, haunted these BJP throughout the Rao Government. (Hansen & Jaffrelot, 
pp.291-314.) 
 
Narasimha Rao could not stop the Congress sliding down. In the poll of 1996 the 
Congress secured 161 and the BJP gained 141 seats. Though the coalition 
government emerged in 1989, coalition governments became common from 1996 on 
as Table 5 shows. 
 
Table 5 
Formations of Governments in India after 1989 
Vishwanath Pratap Singh Government in 1989 
• Coalition government: National Front ( JD Janata Dal, and others 142),  
Left(50), BJP(86) 
• Opposition: Congress (197), Others (68) 
Narasimha Rao Congress Government in 1991 
• Congress (232), Congress Allies (10) 
• Opposition: BJP (120), JD (56), Left (55), Others (70) 
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H. D. Deve Gowda Government in 1996 
• Coalition government: United Front (180)(JD43, LF44, Others93 )  
Allied with Congress (136) 
• Opposition: BJP (161), Others (66) 
Atal Behari Vajpayee Government in 1998 
• Coalition government: BJP (178), Allies (72)  
• Opposition: Congress (145), Allied ( 24), UF (96), Others (26) 
Atal Behari Vajpayee Government in 1999 
• Coalition government: BJP (180), Allies (118)  
• Opposition: Congress (113), Allies (22), Others (110)  
[sources: Ahuja & Paul, Hansen & Jaffrelot, The Hindu] 
 
After the elections in May 1996 Prime Minister Rao resigned and Atal Behari Vajpayee 
tried to form a minority government with allied parties. Vajpayee made a nominal list of 
ministers but after 13 days his bid to form a cabinet was crushed at the Lok Sabha 
where a motion of nonconfidence was carried. 
 
Eventually an unexpected person, H. D. Deve Gowda, was selected as Prime Minister 
of the government of the United Front (National Front and Left Front). Deve Gowda’s 
own party, JD, held only 43 seats and altogether 14 parties made up a coalition of 180 
seats, supported strongly by Narasimha Rao and his party. At this time there were 
three segments in Indian politics, the BJP and the Congress and the UF. Since the UF 
consisted of many factions, those small parties might be drawn to either camp. So 
theoretically there was a chance of forming a two party system at that time in India. 
But the outcome did not go according to plan as laid by theories of political science.  
 
Sitaram Kesri, President of the Congress after Narasimha Rao, resorted to cheap 
manoeuvres often, which pulled down the Deve Gowda government in 1997 and 
again made I. K. Gujral, next Prime Minister from the UF, decide to dissolve the Lok 
Sabha within a year. 
 
At the 1998 General Election the BJP expanded to 178 and secured 74 seats from the 
allied parties. It can be said that, since the UF and the Congress were disputing and 
competing with each other, the BJP earned a windfall benefit. Vajpayee formed a 
coalition government with 12 other parties. But consequently the BJP-led government 
  
81
was burdened by allies, especially the AIADMK (All India Anna Dravida Munnetra 
Kazhagam) led by Ms. Jayalalitha. This local party from Tamil Nadu put the 
government under intense pressure, so Prime Minister Vajpayee had no alternative 
but to go to the poll after the withdrawal of the AIADMK in 1999. The result of the 1999 
General Election was by and large the same as that of 1998. The decline of the 
Congress did not stop in spite of desperate endeavours by its new leader, Sonia 
Gandhi. The BJP and its 23 allies got 298 seats, and the Congress and its allies were 
reduced to 135. The AIADMK that brought about the election was reduced to 8 from 
18.  
 
After two general elections the BJP has built up its influence at the Lok Sabha and the 
local assemblies as well. Now the formation of a coalition government seems to 
become possible for the BJP and its tiny but many allied parties. If the BJP keeps 
expanding, it will be possible for it to form an exclusive BJP government in the future. 
But it may better to say that the BJP and its allies vs. the Congress and its allies could 
become the basic structure of Indian politics, while the left parties, CPI and CPI (M), 
would remain in the same positions. The National Front consisting of Janata Dal and 
other local parties could form a possible vote bank to add to the influence of either 
camp. 
 
In regard to the efforts by the BJP to modify its fierce slogans, Hindutva and Swadeshi, 
the BJP set out a new interpretation in its Manifesto of National Democratic Alliance 
(1999) as follows: 
 
‘Genuine Secularism; We are committed to establishing a civilised, humane and just 
civil order, that which does not discriminate on grounds of caste, religion, class, 
colour, race and sex. We will truly and genuinely uphold and practise the concept of 
secularism consistent with the Indian tradition of ‘Sarva panth samadara’(equal 
respect to all faith) and on the basis of equality of all. 
 
We will, therefore, strive to develop national consensus on all major issues 
confronting the nation by involving the opposition parties and all sections of society 
in dialogue. We will also try for a consensus mode of governance as far as 
practicable.’  (Bhambhri, pp. 171-86.) 
 
There is no longer any sign here of Hindutva or Swadeshi. It seems that the voters in 
India are persuaded by the standpoint of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance.  
Though the influence of the Congress with new leaders is not at an end, it can’t be 
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denied that today the BJP, a religion-based political party, has definitely come right 
into the centre of the Indian political scene.  
 
3 Conclusion 
In terms of the party system we can see similarities between India and Japan. Both 
countries used to be ruled by the ‘one dominant party system’, the Congress in India 
and the LDP in Japan. Both countries are democratic countries where the change of 
power is taken for granted, but because of the ‘one dominant party system’ the 
change of power has hardly taken place. It has only materialised recently. Both 
countries went into the age of coalition governments in the 1990s. 
 
As to religion-based parties, with the declaration of secularism and the separation 
between politics and religion, the BJP grew up to grasp political power in India, and in 
Japan Komeito joined coalition governments in the 1990s. The principles of both 
parties were faced with the difficult questions of how they were to adjust to a new age, 
the age of coalitions. 
 
The similarities in both countries are up to this point. Differences can be seen in each 
country. Komeito has lost its raison d’être in two ways. When it clearly declared that 
Komeito would be a national party in 1970, it discarded its cause of Obutsu Myogo 
(establishing society based on Buddhist philosophy). Of course it expounded policies 
based on new principles, but then what was the basic difference between Komeito 
and other parties? Was it necessary to establish a new party? The SG members could 
have insisted on their wishes inside some established political party. After all they did 
not give up their religious causes. They introduced secular policies as basic ones only 
to avoid social pressures. They kept the spirit of Obutsu Myogo secretly in the 
organisation, and it worked well since the unity of the SG was perfect and the direction 
of its political activities was conveyed as ‘religious guidance’. 
 
Komeito was faced with the second crisis of its raison d’être when it joined the 
Hosokawa coalition government in 1993, and especially when it dissolved the party to 
merge with the New Frontier Party in 1994. From the viewpoint of the party system it 
was the only occasion to establish a two party system in Japan. But from the religious 
standpoint of Komeito it was almost impossible to seek out its religious causes within 
the new anti-LDP party. But after this party was extinguished in 1997, Komeito was 
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revitalized. Did Komeito regain its religious causes? It seems not. It probed the 
political situation for a new coalition, and in 1999 Komeito joined the LDP Coalition 
Government. Again it could survive as part of the power struggle, but it could not 
achieve its religious targets inside the coalition government. 
 
In 2000 the coalition government consists of LDP, Komeito and the Conservative Party, 
and the opposition consists of the Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, the SDPJ and 
the CPJ. Komeito and the SG can boast of holding the casting vote in Japanese 
politics, because even the LDP nowadays flirts with them. But it can also be said that 
Komeito and the SG are important for the LDP only because they have a great vote 
bank. Whatever direction Japanese politics is going, religious causes cannot be 
achieved if the present coalition government continues as it is. 
 
Meanwhile the BJP made the most of religious causes. It could expand because of its 
religious character. The Congress tried to attract people of all castes by Nehruvian 
Socialism, while the BJP provoked people to a high state of tension by Hindutva. As 
the organization went on expanding, the BJP was faced with various problems on its 
way. Among them I picked up two questions to consider. First in terms of collecting 
votes Hindu Fundamentalism could be useful to cross over between castes, but it 
could not embrace Muslims and Dalits. If the BJP really wanted political power, it had 
to soften the slogan, Hindutva. Secondly, since the international community was 
changing rapidly, the BJP had to adjust the Indian economy to the global economy if it 
wanted to form an effective government. The BJP overrode the request of the RSS to 
be more religious and to insist on Swadeshi (protectionism), because it was supported 
not just by the RSS but by voters of a wide range. The BJP introduced economic 
liberalisation with special caution. Consequently the BJP did not use the words of 
either Hindutva or Swadeshi in its Manifesto of the National Democratic Alliance 
(1999). 
 
This is important when compared with Komeito, which could never override the 
demands of the SG because Komeito totally depended on the SG. So, when Komeito 
could not meet its religious objects, its raison d’être was lost. 
 
India and Japan are democratic countries. In democratic countries changes of 
governments are taken for granted. In democracy there is no harm having a close 
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relationship between politics and religion. Fanaticism, Totalitarianism, communal riots 
are of course not desirable or acceptable. But, if religious groups can adjust their 
goals to those of a democratic society with diversified values, the separation of church 
and state or the separation between religion and politics will not need academic 
attention in India and Japan. On the one hand the BJP and the RSS, and, on the other, 
Komeito and the SG, will show us the answer in the near future.  
 
 
Abbreviations: 
 
BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party 
Congress: Indian National Congress Party 
RSS: Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 
LDP: Liberal Democratic Party 
SG: Sokagakkai [Value Creation Society] 
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